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Ancora imparo

Abstract
Modern world brought many technological advancements. Smartphone de-
vices stand out among them, due to their popularity caused by having a
large span of options available in a small, portable device. Their usage is
increased in recent years, due to social media platforms, which became an
inevitable part of everyday life, providing the ability to share information
instantly with the selected audience. As popularity commonly causes vulner-
ability, neither smartphones, nor social media are spared of it. Multimedia
content acquired by these devices and shared with other users is often al-
tered for entertainment or malicious purposes, thus raising questions about
its originality and authenticity.
Source identification is one of the burning issues that multimedia foren-
sics copes with. Recent studies have shown that identification procedure
can be successfully conducted relying on the characteristics of camera sensor
noise, thus making it an interesting research approach. However, in order
to obtain reliable results, multimedia tools need to be tested using an ap-
propriate number and variety of multimedia information. Having in mind
the constant development of today’s portable devices, currently available
databases became outdated, making the whole procedure difficult.
This Thesis introduces three novel image and video datasets, taking into
account different types of multimedia and its alterations caused by the ex-
change through popular social media platforms. The first one is MOSES
mobile application, proposed as an elegant option for providing an expand-
able, up-to-date video database. While the initial MOSES dataset contains
SDR (Standard Dynamic Range) videos, the second dataset, named VISION,
combines both SDR and HDR (High Dynamic Range) images and videos,
thus providing the ability of comparison of different types of multimedia ac-
quired by the same device. Due to their rising popularity, special attention
is paid to HDR images. The third proposed dataset is one of the largest
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currently available HDR-based datsets and it enables SDR and HDR images
comparison.
All the created datasets are used for source identification purposes, em-
ploying well-known PRNU (Photo-Response Non-Uniformity)-based meth-
ods. Exchanging multimedia content through social media platforms, using
more complex multimedia types, such as HDR, as well as different camera
movements, is shown to affect PRNU-based source identification procedure.
Its reliability is shown to be dependable on the previously mentioned factors,
thus opening space for further research in the field of multimedia forensics.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Technology has rapidly developed in the past few decades, simplifying many
processes and providing users easier and faster options to produce desired
result. While mobile phones could offer only text messaging and voice calls
two decades ago, today’s devices have overcome providing only telecommu-
nication services. Digital camera, Internet access, mobile applications and
all the available Internet services are included in addition to the previously
existing options when smartphone devices were introduced. Having a wide
range of services available in a small, portable device, caused higher tech-
nology usage. Users started capturing more photographs, recording videos,
editing them in one of the large span of image or video processing appli-
cations and posting them to social media platforms. This enabled digital
media to become available to the world in only a few clicks.
Having in mind that first mobile phone devices did not have a digital cam-
era and that later versions started introducing ones with a very low pixel res-
olution, the only way for capturing quality photographs was using standard
digital camera devices. As most of them were big, robust and heavy, they
were not practical for every day usage, especially for non-professional pho-
tographers. Smartphones provided the advantage of having a high-resolution
in-built camera, available anytime when carrying the smartphone itself. Fur-
thermore, image and video processing software programs were available only
on computer devices and laptops until the recent times. Therefore, multime-
dia content editing was time-consuming, editing software programs were not
wide-spread among the users and more processor and memory power were
required. However, editing is now approachable to the average smartphone
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user, with very low hardware and software requirements.
Introduction of Wi-Fi network provided the ability for uploading and
downloading digital content on a specific location covered by Wi-Fi signal.
The problem of being tied to some location in order to access the Internet has
been overcome by the appearance of mobile networks, which are progressing
in terms of speed, availability and battery consumption over the years. As a
result, a big number of the world’s population has the ability to be reachable
through the Internet, regardless of their current location.
Although technology development brought many advantages, it can be
used for malicious purposes, representing more curse than blessing of to-
day’s world. Digital media is now considered to be the main source of
all the information globally. It has the coverage of almost every informa-
tion related to every case, scenario and field. Therefore, it is often used
in court, as an evidence of criminal activity or as an alibi. This fact puts
the high importance on content originality, which is often harder to examine
in comparison to non-digital evidences. In contrast to the printed media,
manipulation of digital content is much easier due to its vast exposure and
dependability. Information acquired from the digital media devices such as
smartphones, camcorders, cameras etc. can easily be transferred to other de-
vices and edited to change its perspective altogether. With the development
of various post-processing techniques and software programs, information
distortion became very common. Although the programs for digital content
manipulation were developed for simplification of jobs related to camera-
work, they are commonly used in forgery and fraud purposes. This has led
to various difficulties related to the authentication of the information shared
through the world in the form of multimedia content.
While images can be altered in terms of adding or removing an object or
a group of them, videos are easily modified by cutting out a number of frames
from the original content. This can be performed only for fun, to mislead
the public or to cause harm to an individual or a group. Digital content
altered only for the purpose of entertainment usually can be identified as
unreliable even with the bare eyes and ears, because it commonly contains
awkwardly replaced parts of an image or changed audio parts where voice
is non-synchronized with lip movements. On the other hand, misleading the
public with altered digital content is sometimes performed by journalists,
especially yellow press, to produce sensationalist news. One form of delusion
spread by media are also retouched photographs of models and celebrities,
3where their look is brought to perfection. While the last mentioned example
of alteration causes no harm to the individuals shown in the images, hiding
some objects from the image or introducing the nonexistent ones can be very
harmful in case the image represents an evidence on the court or is used for
the purposes of defamation.
Various incidents have witnessed in the recent past that a personal judg-
ment can be based only upon the seen multimedia files. Internet consumers
are often warned to keep themselves protected and to pay attention to the
information they share through the network. Despite following these secu-
rity measures ensures the safety of user’s account and allows only him to
share the information he wants, images and videos can still be endangered.
Since the shared content is commonly downloadable, it becomes accessible
for malicious users who can edit it and re-post it afterwards. Having in mind
the crucial importance of digital information security and credibility, strong
measures have to be taken in order to prevent the information manipula-
tion and to provide authentication of distributed multimedia for the efficient
communication and information storage.
Forensics is the field which investigates cases of tampering and crime.
Multimedia forensics is one of its branches, which has the important role in
investigation of information security and which acts as a key technology of
digital evidence authentication [7]. Its domain ranges from the investigation
to the recovery of damage caused intentionally or unintentionally to the
parent information [8,9]. It is one of the cornerstones to accumulate and fetch
data regarding criminal activities [10], content manipulation and security
breaches, as well as the sharing of tampered data. Moreover, it is important
to note that multimedia forensics sometimes faces the problem of information
manipulation in such high rates that it is very difficult to distinguish the
original content from the tampered or fake one. Having the information as
dynamic variable, it becomes very hard to investigate it in the minimum
time possible.
Forensics does not operate and gain the results on their own. The in-
vestigation procedures follow certain codes and links to identify the initial
information and separate it from the mixed one. Statistical analysis is often
conducted, due to the valuable results it can give in the process of detection
of data alternation. Authentication of the content involves tracing of spe-
cific links, logos, ambience lighting, or any sort of clue which was present
in the original content. This process can also include several types of in-
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formation or data preservation. Most common ones are digital watermarks,
data information console, copyright registration and trademark registration.
Previously listed techniques are used in the field of multimedia forensics as
the basis for further analysis. Information stored around the base points is
then accumulated, in order to diagnose manipulation of the images, videos
or other forms of multimedia content.
This thesis focuses on source identification procedure used in multimedia
forensics, taking into account the specifics of today’s portable devices and
popular social media platforms.
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 describes the prerequisites
for source identification process. Multimedia forensics and its tasks are pre-
sented, as well as characteristics of HDR (High Dynamic Range) multimedia,
which is of a special interest for the conducted research. In order to help
understanding the processes behind the multimedia forensics algorithms per-
formed on images and videos, the process of their formation is explained, as
well as the impacts of camera movements on the obtained multimedia files.
Chapter 3 provides literature review, focusing on the existing algorithms for
forgery detection and source identification, as well as on the existing image
and video datasets, which are of a special importance for any kind of mul-
timedia forensics analysis. PRNU-based approach in source identification is
described in Chapter 4, while Chapter 5 presents MOSES mobile application
and its initial video dataset, as well as the PRNU-based source identification
experiments conducted on the mentioned collection of videos. Chapter 6
presents a novel VISION dataset of images and videos, which are used for
source pattern noise fingerprints comparison. Similarly, Chapter 7 presents
PRNU-based source identification over a novel dataset of HDR images and
analyzes the obtained results. Finally, Chapter 8 gives the conclusion and
guidance for further research on the topics engaged in this thesis.
1.1 The objective
This thesis aims to investigate the results of multimedia source identification
in the challenging conditions caused by rapid technology development and
popularity of social media platforms. While technological progress brought
a wide range of options for capturing images and recording videos, thus in-
troducing difficulties in content originality and authenticity detection, social
media platforms enabled rapid sharing of those multimedia files. Both of
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the processes leave their marks on the original content, making it possible
to investigate if the forgeries or malversations occurred.
As the current state-of-the-art literature does not provide a large number
of multimedia files acquired by modern portable devices, the first problem
this thesis copes with is up-to-date, large enough dataset formation. Con-
sidering that modern devices introduced differences in the capturing and
recording processes, as well as novel possibilities for producing visually more
realistic and appealing multimedia, suitable dataset creation was necessary
for further multimedia forensics investigations.
Not only complexity of multimedia files introduces difficulties for mul-
timedia forensics, but also the files exchange, due to different compression
levels, algorithms and number of compression times performed. This became
a burning problem, since social media platforms reached a popularity they
have today. Due to the very easy multimedia sharing, it became of a huge im-
portance to check multimedia content’s originality. As source identification
is one of the possibilities to perform that, this thesis focuses on investigating
the impacts of possible obstacles introduced by modern multimedia on the
well-known source identification algorithms.
1.2 Contributions
During the research work for this thesis, three novel datasets were intro-
duced for the purposes of carrying out multimedia forensics algorithms for
source identification and forgery detection. Various experiments were con-
ducted using the introduced datasets, thus providing valuable results of the
well-known source identification algorithms executed on multimedia files ac-
quired by modern smartphone devices. Differences between standard SDR
(Standard Dynamic Range) multimedia and its more complex HDR (High
Dynamic Range) counterpart were specially considered during the analysis,
as well as the problems occurring on the multimedia files transferred through
social media platforms.
The first contribution is MOSES mobile application. It was developed
for the purposes of video recording and storing, hence producing up-to-date
video dataset, including a large variety of contents acquired by a wide range
of smartphone devices. Application offers choosing the capturing motion
and scenario type before recording, and stores the information about the
record and source device afterwards. The initial dataset was formed using
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the MOSES application, in order to test its usage, as well as to proceed
the multimedia forensics algorithms and investigate their results. Dataset is
then expanded by exchanging a number of original videos through social me-
dia platform (i.e. by uploading to and downloading from YouTube), which
resulted in a total of 1,209 SDR videos. By including both original and
exchanged files in the dataset, testing the influence of an introduced com-
pression and other possible modifications was enabled. PRNU-based source
identification was conducted on this dataset and obtained results have shown
significant differences between original and exchanged videos. Therefore, the
research conducted in this thesis can serve as a starting point for further in-
vestigation of impact of video exchange through social media platforms on
the original file. Moreover, MOSES shows a potential of becoming one of
the largest video datasets, due to its world-wide availability and the idea of
easy expandability. Since it enables anyone with the installed mobile appli-
cation to upload their video, not only the database can be expanded, but
the information about devices can also be obtained. This can help in coping
with the problem of unknown devices.
VISION is the second created dataset, which includes both SDR and
HDR images and videos. The number of images contained is 34,427, while
the number of videos is 1,914. Unlike the first introduced dataset, which
contains only videos, VISION provides combination of both types of multi-
media files in SDR and HDR formats, thus providing the ability to investigate
source identification based on different types of multimedia. Furthermore,
researches outside of the field of multimedia forensics can be conducted using
VISION dataset. For example, differences between image and video creation
using the same camera can be investigated for a large set of modern smart-
phone devices. The focus of this thesis was on investigation in terms of mul-
timedia forensics, specifically PRNU-based source identification, differences
in PRNU estimates between different types of multimedia files and impact of
social media exchange on images and videos contained in VISION. Storing
the same information about the multimedia files and their acquiring devices,
VISION is MOSES-compatible dataset and can therefore be extended with
videos and frames (images) obtained by MOSES in the future.
Finally, the third introduced dataset consists of total of 5,415 HDR
and SDR images and thus represents one of the largest currently available
datasets focusing on HDR images. This dataset was formed using variety
models of modern smartphone devices. Using the introduced dataset, HDR
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analysis and multimedia forensics researches can be conducted taking into
account device specifications such as resolution, operating system, camera
movements, etc. All the previously mentioned parameters can affect the final
results and there is a need for investigation of their influences. This thesis
provides an analysis of PRNU-based source identification, and confirms that
camera movements and device properties have a significant impact on iden-
tifying the acquiring device.
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Chapter 2
Image and video source
identification prerequisites
The aim of this chapter is to describe the processes that lay un-
derneath the problem of image and video source identification.
Tasks of digital forensics and its branches are described in the
first part of the chapter. Characteristics of High Dynamic Range
images are presented afterwards. Finally, principles of multime-
dia content creation using camera devices and impact of camera
movements on the obtained multimedia are explained in the last
two sections of the chapter.
2.1 Introduction
Forensic sciences can be divided by their domain of evidence, which is used
in further analysis. Since we are living in an analog world, classical analog
forensics explores physical evidences, while digital forensics traces digital
ones [11]. Digital evidences appear to be abstract to the individuals outside
the branches related to computer sciences, in contrast to physical evidences,
which are usually intuitive. Underneath the visible and audible content,
digital evidence is written, using binary system, in the form of bit sequences,
which can contain a lot more information than it can be seen or heard. This
sets a difficult task for digital forensic sciences, which analyze all the aspects
of complex digital information.
In the past, due to less exposure and interference, storage and security of
9
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the information were comfortable and less hectic. Before digital revolution,
analog evidences were the only ones that could be endangered. Numerous
of them are still thought to be in their original shape and structure, while
minority is considered as being tampered. Authentic and pure information
maintenance is the reason humans have diagnosed the true essence of life,
universe, religions, social ethics, living creatures, etc. Therefore, analog
forensics has the important task to investigate the physical evidences in order
to provide the trustworthy assessment of information authenticity. There
are two main principles used in this field of forensics: divisibility of matter
and exchange principle [12]. Divisibility of matter implies that all parts
of the same object remain having the same characteristics as the object
as a whole. Exchange principle refers to the fact that when an object is
transferred between individuals, each of them can leave some mark on it,
such as fingerprint, clothing fiber, etc. However, digital forensics is much
more complex and it has been divided to a number of branches in order to
cope with the burning issue of digital evidence investigation.
Digital revolution brought many advantages, but also provided possibil-
ity to easily perform harmful actions. Information and media manipulation
has become the greatest threat for security and storage of the original infor-
mation. Possible reason of this chaos is the ability of each individual to store,
analyze and republish information very quickly and easily. Cheap and af-
fordable devices for information recording and storage, which are widespread
and easily accessible nowadays, have largely contributed to this occurrence.
This has posed threats to information security and media credibility like
never before. As a consequence, the process of proving the originality of
any information has become very painstaking and the number of verification
points have become minimized. Digital forensics deals with this situation
and analyzes available digital evidences in order to prove their authenticity
or alteration.
The main branches of digital forensic sciences are [12]:
• computer forensics,
• mobile device forensics,
• database forensics,
• network forensics,
• multimedia forensics.
Computer forensics is often employed for piracy detection, as well as in
investigation of child pornography and in the process of tracing the source
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computer that contains controversial files which can lead to the person who
committed the crime. This process usually includes isolating the suspect’s
computer or laptop, searching through the files, hidden content and web
history, and making a copy of its hard disk to perform more complex ac-
tions which can reveal the contentious content and participation in criminal
activities.
Similarly, mobile device forensics is a branch of digital forensic science,
which deals with the problem of fraud detection by investigating the infor-
mation obtained using mobile devices. Besides from the phone call logs, SMS
(Short Message Service) messages, instant messaging logs, photographs, tex-
tual, audio and video files, mobile devices can offer GPS (Global Positioning
System) tracks, which can be of a high importance in case of kidnapping or
a mobile device theft.
Database forensics has a different approach to frauds detection in compar-
ison to the previously two described digital forensics branches. It analyzes
database properties, i.e. the data that gives more information about the
database, or so-called metadata. Using this information, it can be detected
when did some change, which is a possible fraud, occur.
Network attacks became very frequent since the Internet emerged. The
task of network forensics is to analyze and detect frauds occurred in both lo-
cal and external (Internet) networks. For those purposes, traffic capturing is
performed and the information captured in a form of small units called pack-
ets is investigated afterwards. Network security is of a high importance for
every individual, because its disruption can lead to files hijacking and iden-
tity theft. In case of companies and especially banks, endangered network
security leads to huge financial losses.
Finally, multimedia forensics analyzes multimedia files, such as images,
audios and videos, in order to check their authenticity. The Thesis focuses
on this branch of digital forensics, which is thus explained in more detail in
the following chapter.
2.2 Multimedia forensics
Multimedia forensics is a branch of digital forensic sciences which is employed
when authenticity of multimedia file is questioned [13]. It gathers various
data points upon images, audio and video files to correlate their existence
and behavior. This approach benefits the probability of assessing tampering
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performed to the investigated information.
All the approaches used in multimedia forensics can be divided into two
groups, based on the information they obtain, having a digital evidence.
Those are active and passive approaches [14]. Active ones cope with the
information added to a multimedia file, such as digital watermark, or digi-
tal signature. Watermarks are inserted by some camera devices on all the
photographs and videos recorded by that device. Digital signature is, on the
other hand, used in digital forms of textual documents. In contrast to active
approaches, passive ones do not possess an active information, and they are
based on the assumption that there is some kind of pattern included in all
the multimedia files obtained by the same device [15]. These approaches are
presented in more detail in the remainder of this section.
2.2.1 Active approaches
Inserting the additional information into original multimedia content is a
helpful technique in source identification and content authentication. The
added information is considered as active and multimedia forensics approach
for the analysis conduction based on it is therefore called active approach.
The most common form of active information in multimedia files are digital
watermarks [16] and digital signatures [17, 18].
Digital watermark refers to a digital code induced in the file before its
delivering. For example, digital cameras, whose manufacturers included wa-
termarking procedure in the photograph or video creation, add a specific
digital code to multimedia content before it gets to the final user [16]. On
the other hand, digital signature can be added to a textual document which
was previously created and available to the user [19]. By adding digital
signature to a multimedia file, the file is secured for sharing. In the first
given example, a special hardware is needed, while the second one requires
post-processing, which explains the term active approach.
Digital signature is an external digital code, which is generated from the
original content and usually encrypted to produce hash values [20]. During
the process of its generation, user’s private key is required for association of
the original content with the signature. Once a digitally signed multimedia
file is received by other user, he can verify if the content is changed by using
sender’s public key. This key in combination to the received content enables
creating another hash code. If the two created hash codes are identical,
multimedia content was not altered. On the other side, difference in only
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one bit of the two generated hash codes signalizes data alteration.
Digital watermarks and signatures are commonly added for copyright pro-
tection, but they can also serve as an element of fraud detection, content au-
thentication or source identification. Watermarks are sometimes not visible
to the eye, but they can be extracted by image or video post-processing [16].
Once the watermark is extracted, it can be compared to the original one
that was added in the process of multimedia file creation, similarly as it
was described in case of digital signatures. Approaches based on water-
marking and digital signatures are of a high importance for contents shared
through the Internet without owner’s permission. Movies are often copied
and shared among the Internet users, who download them without paying
any money [21]. Copyrights of the owner are thus violated and he has right
to sue the user for illegally handling his file. Digital watermarks and signa-
tures can serve as an evidence on the court. This applies not only to the
video files, but also to scientific papers, books [22], images [23], or any other
protected file [24]. Considering previous statements, it becomes clear that
watermarks resistance to any kind of manipulations is of a high importance.
Manipulations do not only refer to the frauds and malicious actions, but
also to compression algorithms used on social media platforms, as well as in
other programs used on Internet, that include uploading and/or downloading
options.
Although active multimedia forensic approach represent an elegant way of
proving who is the content owner and did any malicious manipulation occur,
the major drawback are high requirements. As it is mentioned earlier, either
more complex hardware, or post-processing is needed in order to embed a
watermark in the multimedia content.
It is already described in short in this section how digital signatures and
watermarks can be extracted. However, in order to understand complexity of
active multimedia forensics tasks, it is important to get to know the princi-
ples of content hiding (steganography [25]) and its revelation (steganalysis).
Therefore, the following subsection describes how digital watermarks, signa-
tures, and other hidden data can be extracted from the analyzed content.
Steganalysis - retrieving hidden files/data
Steganography is a technique of hiding information in a visual content and, as
such, is the subject of analysis in the field of multimedia forensics. Stegano-
graphic content may become visible in different ways and the aim of ste-
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ganalysis is to discover that hidden, imprinted content. A file may require
a key, stegokey, or a password to retrieve the secret information, and it is
available only to the intended recipients.
Techniques such as watermarking and digital signatures, as well as cover
channels and secret communication channels, are used to retain files secrecy.
Steganalysis enables forensic technicians to detect those kind of hidden data
embedded in multimedia files [26–30]. For example, techniques such as En-
Case and Ilook Investigator [31] can help in identification of hidden con-
tent in storage devices which contain suspicious empty space. On the other
hand, hidden messages in high-resolution digital images can be detected us-
ing higher-order magnitude and phase image statistics [32]. As they are
commonly employed in the field of multimedia forensics in general, Support
Vector Machines (SVM) and Markov chains can also be used in steganalysis.
While the empirical transition matrices of Markov chain can serve as image
features, SVM can be utilized as a classifier in steganalysis procedure per-
formed on thresholded prediction-error image [33]. This method has shown
to be able to detect more than 85% of the hidden content. Prediction-error
images are also used in combination with neural networks and wavelet de-
composition [34], in order to achieve the same result. Similarly, steganalysis
can be performed on digital video sequences using the same method [35], as
well as performing inter-frame collusion technique, that exploits the temporal
statistical visibility of a hidden message [36,37].
However, more complex steganographic techniques can even prevent recog-
nition of the existence of hidden files [38,39], putting a difficult task ahead of
steganalysis and multimedia forensics itself. Recent studies have developed
powerful steganographic algorithms resistant to the well-known staganalytic
attacks, as well as the ones used on HDR images [40–42], which are of a spe-
cial interest for this research. Having that in mind, it is very important to
keep the steganalysis methods up-to-date in order to cope with the problem
of altered data.
2.2.2 Passive approaches
In contrast to the active approaches in multimedia forensics, passive ones
do not require specific hardware, nor post-processing in order to add digital
signature to a multimedia file. Passive approaches are based on the assump-
tion that original content contains an inherent pattern introduced in the
very process of multimedia file formation. According to this assumption, all
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the originals acquired by the same device should contain the same pattern.
Deviation from the pattern leads to the conclusion that the content has been
changed.
Two main tasks of passive multimedia forensics are source identification
and tampering detection. Besides from the mentioned, passive approaches
are commonly used for discriminating between computer generated and real-
world generated multimedia content.
Process of source identification is conducted relying on the assumption
that all files obtained by the same device include a pattern specific for that
device. That pattern consists of a noise introduced in the multimedia file
formation process and is referred to as fingerprint in literature, because it
uniquely identifies device, just like fingerprint uniquely identifies human be-
ings. Source identification is of a special interest for this thesis, and its
concepts, including fingerprint estimation, are described in detail in the fol-
lowing sections.
Forgery and tampering detection are very hard processes, considering
that alterations are often invisible to the eye and can sometimes be hard to
detect even by employing post-processing algorithms. In order to understand
their complexity, wider description is provided in the following subsection.
It is worth noting that techniques used in forgery detection and in source
identification cannot be distinctively separated. Some of the algorithms de-
veloped for the purposes of forgery detection can successfully identify the
source device, and vice versa.
Forgery detection
Forgery detection enables confirmation of multimedia content authentic-
ity [43]. It largely uses techniques that can detect inconsistencies in ac-
quisition and coding fingerprints, or a total absence of acquisition and cod-
ing fingerprints. The latter is a sure way of confirming that the content of
interest had undergone tampering.
Several techniques can be employed during the forgery detection. Meta
tag data can reveal a plethora of information like source device, editing
software, time of capturing or recording, time of editing (if any), and geo
tags can identify the exact location where image or video was recorded.
However, both meta tag and geo tag data can be tampered, and hence may
provide false leads to the investigators.
Image and video processing can contain a large number of actions which
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result in changing an image or a frame, or obtaining and analyzing the
information it contains. As videos are composed of frames, which are nothing
but images themselves, all the processes that can be conducted on an image
can be performed on a video, as well. Therefore, when any sort of image
processing is mentioned in the remainder of this paper, it is important to
notice that it also applies to the video frames.
Currently operating tools for image forgery detection can be classified into
five major classes [44]:
• pixel-based techniques,
• format-based techniques,
• camera-based techniques,
• physically-based techniques,
• geometric-based techniques.
All the previously mentioned techniques are applied in the specific cir-
cumstances and they have a main contribution in the forensics analysis of
the information.
Digital images and video frames are represented as a set of points, called
pixels, with corresponding values that describe the color of that pixel. There-
fore, pixels are considered as elementary units for these multimedia files.
Pixel-based techniques investigate statistical behavior developed at that el-
ementary level of images or videos.
Malicious image pixel-level editing is often performed by using cloning
tools which enable extraction of one part of an image and cloning it to some
other location, in order to hide the original content. By using statistical
analysis and finding correlation between different picture elements, multi-
media forensics can cope with these kind of frauds, but it is not always easy
to detect them. An example of cloning forgery is shown in Fig. 2.1.
The other common pixel-level editing method is inserting fragments to an
image from the same or some other source, or combining two or more images,
which is usually called splicing. Splicing often requires resizing, rotation, or
stretching a part of an image, in order to produce realistic composite image.
This process implies that the originals have to be resampled, introducing
specific periodic correlation that is unlikely to occur naturally [44], which
helps in detection of these kind of frauds. Techniques such as higher-order
Fourier statistics and artificial intelligence can be employed for coping with
this problem. While detection of disruption of higher-order Fourier statistics
implies that splicing has occurred, techniques employing artificial intelligence
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Figure 2.1: Example of cloning. Forged image (left) is created by hiding
parts of the original content (right) [1].
Figure 2.2: Example of splicing. Original image is shown on the left and
spliced image on the right [2].
enable machines to learn how visual data may appear or change in the near
future, and hence have a predictive element inbuilt, which is used for fraud
detection. An example of splicing is given in Fig. 2.2.
Format-based techniques for forgery detection are relying on the format
of multimedia file. In case of images, the most commonly used format is
JPEG, while MPEG format is used for storing video files by most of the
camera devices. Considering that both JPEG and MPEG formats use lossy
compression, manufacturers typically configure their devices differently in
order to balance compression and quality of the resulting files [44]. This
fact can help not only in forgery detection, but can also serve for source
identification purposes [45]. Furthermore, considering JPEG and MPEG
18 Image and video source identification prerequisites
popularity, there is a high probability that both original and forged multi-
media files will be saved in the same format. Therefore, forged files will be
double compressed, which in case of JPEG and MPEG formats means they
will irretrievably lose on their quality twice, which is the fact multimedia
forensics uses in the forgery investigation.
Camera-based tools allow highlighting camera module’s characteristics,
artificial artifacts in the parent information, as well as contribution of specific
camera lenses and sensors. In order to understand these techniques, it is
important to know how cameras work. Detailed explanation is therefore
given in Section 2.3. All hardware parts included in the process, such as color
filter arrays and sensors, can leave their mark on a produced multimedia file
at some stage of image or video processing, before the result gets to the user
capturing an image or recording a video. Thanks to these marks, source
identification can be performed.
Physically-based procedures allow uplifting of physical characteristic of
an image or video by interlinking physical parameters such as light, lenses
and camera unit. As it is hard to balance the light from multiple different
images, these procedures are especially focused on investigation of lightning
characteristics in potentially forged image or video.
Finally, geometric-based methods calculate geometric perspective of the
parent information related to the positions and locations relative to the in-
formation recording device. Projection of the camera center onto the image
plane is called principal point [45] and it is the most interesting subject of
analysis in geometric-based forgery detection. It is shown that translation of
an object in the image causes a proportional principal point movement [46].
Comparing the estimated position of principal point to the calculated one,
tampering can be detected.
Previously mentioned editing processes can be very complicated and per-
formed at a high level, using less known and unexplored techniques, which
require higher level of investigation in order to determine the content’s orig-
inality. Latest developments in technology have brought not only visual
inputs, but also thermal and other sensory data into the gamut of what
computer vision can analyze [47]. However, multimedia forensic science con-
tinues to develop and copes with the newly introduced problems.
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2.3 Digital image formation
In order to understand how it is possible to perform source identification
based on some features extracted from an image, it is important to under-
stand the way digital capturing devices work. Although devices themselves
can have different purposes and different implementations, some processes
can be more or less generalized in case of image capturing, regardless of the
manufacturer and device type (digital camera, mobile phone, tablet, or any
other device with a capturing option).
Block diagram of a typical digital camera is given in Fig. 2.3. All the
included components can be divided into three groups: optical and mechani-
cal subsystem, an image sensor and an electronic subsystem [3]. The process
starts when the light passes through the camera lenses. It travels further
through shutter and diaphragm, anti-aliasing filters and color filter arrays,
before reaching the most important component for digital image creation -
imaging sensor or image sensor. Shutter and diaphragm are in charge for
making the exposure by briefly uncovering the camera aperture. While anti-
aliasing filters are optical low-pass filters used in order to prevent frequency
components overlapping, color filter arrays filter out some spectrum ranges
to provide that each pixel detects only one color. That way, the photons are
being prepared for the imaging sensor, which is sensitive only to monochro-
matic light. Imaging sensor then collects filtered photons and converts them
into voltages. The sensor’s output is analog signal, which needs to be pro-
cessed by analog pre-processor, which contains sample-and-hold circuits for
sampling and quantization, and performs operations such as color separa-
tion, Automatic Gain Control (AGC), tone adjustment, etc. [3]. Processed
signal is finally converted to its digital counterpart using Analog-to-Digital
(A/D) converter. For the purpose of getting the image in color, signal is
demosaiced or interpolated by digital signal processors (DSP) or micropro-
cessors. These components can also scale the signal to achieve proper white
balance [48].
Most of the capturing and recording devices include display, as well as
memory card socket and connectors. These components can be connected to
DSP through a data bus. Apart from the mentioned camera elements, block
diagram shown in Fig. 2.3 contains a system controller, which is in charge
of controlling the camera operations, such as auto-focus and automatic ex-
posure.
Mathematical formation of the previously described procedure before de-
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Figure 2.3: Block diagram of a typical digital camera [3].
mosaicking process can be described by the relation (2.1), which applies to
each pixel of an image. The equation represents a simplified output model of
the image sensor. Symbol I in the equation denotes the quantized luminance
value at analyzed pixel, K is the PRNU (Photo Response Non Uniformity)
factor, Y represents the incident light intensity, g is the channel color gain
factor, γ stands for gamma-correction factor, Θq is quantization noise, while
Λ includes combination of other noise sources. PRNU factor K is the most
interesting element for the analysis conducted in this research and will be
further explained in one of the following sections. At this place, it is only
important to note that it is a noise-like signal responsible for the finger-
print [49], which enables source identification.
I = gγ × [(1 +K)Y + Λ]γ + Θq (2.1)
By performing some basic mathematical operations, the sensor output
model described by relation (2.1), can be simplified in order to calculate the
factor K. This factor can be used in further analysis for source identification.
Procedure of its calculation is described in Chapter 4.
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2.4 HDR multimedia characteristics
Images are digitally represented as a collection of tiny dots, colored and
arranged in a pattern of pixels, that a computer has to understand and
envisage as a concrete and recognizable object within the backdrop of space.
This is what a basic image recognition software does [50]. However, owing
to the complexity of digital image and video reproduction, it is likely that
an image (which can also be a video frame) itself captures only a smaller
percentage of the actual data that exists from the object.
Images are likely to be degraded, as far as the presentation of color, de-
tailing or texture is concerned. With advances in technology, it is possible to
get HDR (High Dynamic Range) images, which give a closer representation
of the natural object. Nowadays, a large number of images and videos are
captured/recorded and processed using HDR technology. This leads to the
problem of forensic detection of such images and tracing history of digital
image.
Majority of today’s multimedia devices enable HDR option when user
is capturing a photograph or recording a video. The abbreviation HDR,
which stands for High Dynamic Range, shortly describes its difference in
comparison to standard profile for capturing and recording. HDR introduces
wider range of luminance in multimedia content, providing more realistic
captures. While standard capturing profile, better known as SDR (Standard
Dynamic Range), does not allow big luminance adjustments and is therefore
sensitive in cases of bad lighting conditions and facing the source of light,
HDR profile copes with these problems and simulates the way human’s visual
system adjusts to these kind of lighting changes.
One of the examples of adjustment that HDR image introduces in case
when camera device is facing the source of light is given in Fig. 2.4. In case
of SDR images captured in the same conditions, results cannot reach the
quality of HDR ones, even with brightness and contrast adjustment.
In digital world, images and videos are represented using three color
channels: red, green and blue. Each of the channels normally employs eight
bits for color representation, having 28 = 256 possibilities for channel value.
Combination of values of all the channels results in total of 1.6 million dif-
ferent colors that can be represented using SDR profile, which seems like
an enormously big number. However, our visual system can perceive much
larger number of colors, and HDR profile provides that in multimedia files
by using floating point representation of values, instead of integers used in
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Figure 2.4: Example of SDR (left) and HDR (right) captures taken while
camera was facing light source and capturing an object against it [4].
8-bit SDR channels. Each pixel in an image or a video frame is represented
as 16-bit or 32-bit floating number in HDR representation.
In order to see the original HDR image, special devices are needed. There-
fore, it is worth noting that only a small number of devices have the ability
of showing original HDR content and that the printed HDR image always
possesses reduced dynamic range [4]. This reduction is performed by specific
algorithms and is often referred to as tone-mapping in literature.
Creation of HDR images can be performed by employing one of the following
methods:
• rendering algorithms and other digital graphics techniques,
• employing conventional SDR cameras by capturing a static scene mul-
tiple times, with varying exposure time, and combining the captures
afterwards [4].
Most of the capturing devices, especially mobile phones and tablets, create
HDR images using the latter method. It is worth noting that one HDR
image represents an HDR frame in a video, and therefore the previously de-
scribed process applies to the videos, as well. The only difference is in higher
requirements for the execution time of one HDR image creation when HDR
videos are recorded, for the purposes of real-time recording and processing.
Due to the need of combining the captures in order to obtain one HDR
image, it is important to avoid any camera movements between different
shots. If a camera device is not still, the final result will contain visible parts
of the images that were combined and displaced in relation to the other.
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2.5 Impact of camera movements on the ob-
tained multimedia files
While capturing images of a landscape at night, most people faced a problem
of getting blurry images as a result. This problem is caused by shaking
camera device in the moment of capturing and is known as camera shake.
It occurs even in the daylight images, but is less noticeable to a human eye
in case of good lighting conditions. Images captured at night or in case of
bad indoor lighting are vulnerable to motion blur because of the necessity
of longer exposure times [51]. Taking into account that HDR images are
mostly produced as a combination of SDR images captured with variable
exposure times, it is natural to assume that they are more vulnerable to
the artifacts than their standard SDR counterparts. The occurred errors
accumulate when combining SDR images, which makes the post-processing
procedures for blur suppression more complex. Therefore, the information
about camera movements is valuable in the process of source identification
using HDR images.
Camera shake can be modeled as a blur kernel, describing the camera
motion during exposure, convolved with the image intensities [52]. A large
number of post-processing algorithms for blur reduction have been created,
but in most cases, it is important for the user to capture the image without
a need for post-processing. Camera shake can be prevented by using a tri-
pod when employing conventional digital cameras, but as the light-weighted
mobile devices with high camera resolutions are available at relatively small
price nowadays, tripod is not a common equipment in case of images cap-
tured on daily basis. Moreover, tripod is not a guarantee for an artifact-free
image. Even pressing the capturing button or exposure time change causes
camera movements which can produce visible blurring effect [53].
Blur is a result of pixel offsets occurred in the process of image formation
in camera device, destroying details in the capture. It is worth noting that
offset can be produced not only in case of camera movements, but also in
case of moving the object that is being captured. The latter often produces
so-called ghost effect, because of the shades which form a ghost-alike object.
Previously mentioned side-effects of image capturing and video recording
can seriously endanger the processes carried out in multimedia forensics.
Therefore, it is important to examine their influence when the analysis in
terms of source identification or forgery detection is conducted.
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Chapter 3
Literature review
This chapter aims to discuss state-of-the-art on algorithms em-
ployed in multimedia forensics, specific tools and technologies
used in source identification and forgery detection, as well as their
applications and future trends that can be expected in both source
identification and forgery detection processes. The last section of
the chapter engages in the analysis of available datasets of images
and videos that could be used in multimedia forensics.
3.1 Forgery detection algorithms
Multimedia forensic analysts recently started to study statistical properties
of pixels, in order to improve currently available methods and algorithms
used for forgery detection. One of the results of such researches is design of
contrast enhancement detectors using pixel-graylevel histogram’s peak-gap
artifacts introduced in the process of forgery detection. Unfortunately, this
approach did not yield accurate results. However, a recent research [54] has
introduced new variants of the contrast enhancement operators that enable
better detection.
In contrast to the previously mentioned pixel-based method, format-
based techniques can use quantization tables, employed in JPEG compres-
sion, for detection of image tampering [55]. One of them is forgery detection
software that uses nine Benford features extracted from quantized Discrete
Cosine Transform (DCT) coefficients of original and morphed images, both
JPEG compressed. Features are afterwards fitted to a logarithmic curve [56].
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This enables tracing the changes that were imposed by morphing a fake im-
age, and even a single parameter of the logarithmic curve is sufficient to find
a difference between the original and morphed image. This software is ex-
pected to find extensive usage in security agencies, where facial recognition
is based on photo IDs, and may be compromised if the used IDs include
tampered images.
A number of scientific papers have focused on physically-based multi-
media forensics approach, using light detection methods to identify images
that have been used in tampering process. The example of this approach
are methods that detect light sources within images and can predict how an
image may appear when observed in different viewing environments. This
technology enables isolating pixel and identifying a subset of pixels associ-
ated with the same light source and then configuring a pre-determined pa-
rameter to generate the color that a reproduced image should posses. This,
in turn, enables identification of portions of image that have been faked or
morphed [57].
Malicious alteration of images is mostly performed only in some regions
(added or removed objects), which leaves a digital mark on an image, even
if it cannot be noticed with a bare eye. Forgery localization is shown to be
feasible using DCT coefficients [58–61], DWT (Discrete Wavelet Transfor-
mation) coefficients [62] and SVD (Singular Value Decomposition) [63], as
well as image matching techniques, such as SIFT (Scale-Invariant Feature
Transform) [64] and SURF (Speeded Up Robust Features) [65] descriptors.
Numerous algorithms were developed for these purposes, and they keep up
being improved by the researchers. However, all of them were created mainly
for standard SDR images.
By generating a 3D model using some digital image and juxtaposing it on
Google map, it is possible to verify if the image in question is the original and
authentic one, or it is fake. Using the backdrop of landscape, and considering
the time of the day, as well as weather conditions, it is possible to determine
if an image was taken at the time claimed and by the source claimed. 3D
modelling technology enables an accurate assessment of the genesis of an
image and also helps in differentiating between the original and tampered
version [66].
In another attempt to identify recaptured images and differentiate them
from the original ones, researchers Yin & Fang [67] found that recaptured
images posses changed statistics, which can be characterized using Markov
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process-based features. These features were extracted using DCT coefficient
arrays. SVM (Support Vector Machines) training was then employed in order
to identify differences between a dataset containing 3,994 recaptured images
and to compare them against a similar number of originals.
A large number of algorithms employed in image forensics uses a single
image in the analysis of possible frauds. However, a group of images can be
analyzed [68] to explore their mutual dependencies which can provide a valu-
able information about the image history. This approach introduced more
similarity to image and video forensics, considering the analysis is usually
performed on a set of frames in case of video forensics. While image forg-
eries usually occur on a specific image region, video tampering is commonly
performed on a frame level, either by removing the existing or introducing
new frames.
Detection of tampering in video frames is even more complicated, as
duplication is cumbersome and too time-consuming to justify its usage. Re-
searchers Wang and Farid [69] invented an algorithm that made it time-
efficient to detect duplicated frames, as well as duplicated regions within
video frames. Detection of duplicated regions that is suggested by the men-
tioned authors was based on the work of Popescu and Farid [70]. Previous
researches of the same group of authors resulted in development of tech-
niques that depended on assessing MPEG (Moving Picture Experts Group)
compression [71] and using interlaced and de-interlaced videos [69].
Besides from the above mentioned algorithms, there are numerous other
known approaches for detection of frame insertion or deletion. Some of them
are employing machine learning techniques for feature-based detection [72],
computing the total motion residual of video frame [73], using the fact that
inter-frame forgery will disturb the optical flow consistency [74] and detecting
MCEA (Motion-Compensated Edge Artifact) [75].
Despite the large number of algorithms developed for image and video
forensics purposes, they keep up being improved by the research community
and new approaches are frequently presented in the literature. However,
majority of them are created mainly for standard SDR images and videos,
which leaves the space for further investigation, especially considering the
powerful options and properties of today’s smartphone devices and other
portable devices.
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3.2 Source identification algorithms
As it was stated in one of the previous sections, source identification and
forgery detection principles can overlap, thus causing that both processes
can be performed using a single algorithm, or at least relying on the same
principle. Authors in [76] have shown that format-based approach used in
forgery detection can also serve as source identifier. By relying on the fact
that manufacturers usually develop their own algorithms for JPEG compres-
sion, it is demonstrated in [76] that choice of JPEG quantization table acts
as an effective discriminator between model series, with a high level of dif-
ferentiation. Understanding this procedure requires understanding forgery
possibilities and principles followed in order to detect them. They are there-
fore described in Sections 2.2.2 and 3.1.
In the recent times, camera model identification based on captured im-
age or recorded video became a standard procedure in multimedia foren-
sics. However, techniques that can actually identify the exact camera device
that made the capture/recording are still being explored. Most of the to-
day’s source identification techniques aim to identify the acquisition traces
from multimedia files. State-of-the-art tools available for multimedia foren-
sics analysis therefore focus on extracting the acquisition fingerprinting data
and comparing it with some pre-developed dataset of fingerprints that have
already traced genealogy to specific camera model or brand [77].
Researchers came to the conclusion that the source device, from which
HDR multimedia file originated, can be accurately determined by isolating
the fingerprint of the HDR-induced effects and running them through SVM
classifier [78]. As it is described in Section 2.3, each camera device and model
introduces its unique fingerprint through the lens, sensor and color filter
array. More specifically, each lens is unique and has certain characteristics
or aberrations, like the lateral chromatic aberration, which results in different
wavelengths of light to focus on different sections of the image plane [79].
This information can be used for the purposes of tracing to a specific camera
device.
Similarly, sensor related aberration, or noise, is unique to each camera
device as it is a result of some imperfections in the image sensor. These
imperfections create some differences between the scene and image captured
by the camera [80], leaving a unique mark. Moreover, each camera sensor
has a distinct radiometric response which is likely to be similar across the
same brand [8].
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Just like the camera sensor, color filter array contributes with its unique
mark as it enables interpolation of the color scheme in an image [81]. As
it was mentioned earlier, marks, better known as fingerprints, can be trace-
able to the exact camera device. Therefore, multimedia forensics algorithms
based on noise are of a special interest for this research. The ones based on
Photo-Response Non-Uniformity (PRNU) noise have shown the great suc-
cess in source identification and are widely used in practice. While authors
in [82–84] employed PRNU noise for source identification using images, video
source identification was performed following the same principle in [85, 86].
Characteristics of PRNU, as well as the process of PRNU-based source iden-
tification are described in more detail in Chapter 4.
Source identification can be automatized using deep learning methodol-
ogy, which is a very popular approach nowadays. In order to get reliable
results, deep learning algorithms require a large set of information about the
available devices. This fact implies that the list of known devices and their
features has to be frequently updated, so that the device can be correctly
identified. Otherwise, if source device is unknown, deep learning algorithm
can only detect a wrong device, whose features have the highest correla-
tion value with features of all the known devices. This problem is addressed
in [87], where the authors described a process of its overcoming by identifying
unknown camera models.
Learning features of source devices is conducted using convolutional neu-
ral networks, which is a complex computational model partially based on
human neural system and its functioning [88]. Features that are used in
learning process are the ones that are specific for a source device, mostly
artifacts produced during the image or video acquisition. This means that
deep learning methodology can be combined with PRNU-based source identi-
fication procedure, making it automatized. Authors in [88] have proved that
dividing an image into several patches can be useful for PRNU detection and
that deep learning methodology can result in highly reliable source identifi-
cation in this case. However, a drawback of this method is its computational
complexity and time needed for the algorithm execution.
Recent studies have shown to be able to detect and identify not only the
source capturing device, but also from which embedded camera the image
was captured [89]. Since both of the procedures can be performed with a
high accuracy, deep learning methodology employed for multimedia forensics
purposes is expected to be used even more in the future, improving currently
30 Literature review
existing source identification algorithms.
3.3 Data origin classification
Convolutional neural networks can be used not only for source identification
purposes, but also for data origin classification. In today’s world, where
social media has a great impact on society, it is of a huge importance to
be aware of the data origin and to distinguish if an image or a video was
downloaded or acquired by some user device. This information can be of a
crucial importance in court, when investigating digital evidences. Tracing
images back to their social network of origin is analyzed in [90, 91], where
the authors proposed methods based on convolutional neural networks to
determine whether an image originates from a social network, a messaging
application or directly from a photocamera. Features were extracted in the
image frequency domain and then used in the training phase of the process,
in order to identify the origin of the image among different social networks.
It was shown that this method is able to identify the social platform of
provenance.
Since PRNU-based techniques for source identification proved to be very
robust and accurate, researches came to an idea to use PRNU fingerprint
for origin social network detection [92], as well. It was demonstrated that
PRNU is diversely modulated by different social networks and that it can
therefore be adopted as a feature for training convolutional neural network
and later detection of the social network of origin.
3.4 Image and video datasets overview
Several projects were undertaken, and several are in progress, to develop
databases of fully annotated images [93], which can act as an evaluation
point for forensic analysts. Most of these databases are available in the
public domain and they find extensive usage in forensic analysis. Researchers
Gloe and Bo¨hme [94] have documented an image database consisting of over
14,000 images that were acquired using controlled situations which made
them traceable to 73 different types of digital camera devices. Database was
supplemented with additional information regarding specific noise pattern
of each camera device and model-specific JPEG (Joint Photographic Experts
Group) compression. This database, known as Dresden Image Database, can
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be used by researchers and analysts as a benchmark in identifying source
camera devices.
HMDB (The Human Motion DataBase) [95] contains total of 6,766 video
clips extracted from a wide range of sources. This database was introduced in
2011 for the purposes of action recognition and its robustness under various
conditions, such as camera motion, viewpoint, video quality and occlusion.
Taking into account that a large number of source devices were used, this
database can provide some valuable information about their characteristics
and serve for the purposes of source identification.
Unlike HMDB, SULFA (Surrey University Library for Forensic Analysis)
is a video dataset created for the purposes of multimedia forensics investiga-
tions, specifically localization of cloned regions. SULFA contains 150 videos
in low resolution (320×240) pixels, with the 10 seconds duration. The orig-
inal videos included in the dataset are acquired using three different cam-
corders, while forged videos were created using Adobe software. However,
technology has rapidly developed in the recent years and there is a need of
updating the video and image databases, in order to include more complex,
high-resolutioned multimedia content, provided by today’s devices.
While many SDR image and video datasets are accessible on-line and for
free, there is a small number of image datasets which contain HDR images
and videos, due to the complexity of their formation.
One of the most commonly used HDR image dataset dates from 2007 and
was created by Fairchild, under HDR Photographic Survey project [96]. The
other known datasets mostly include several different types of images and/or
videos, not focusing only on the HDR profile. The Fairchild’s dataset consists
of a total of 106 HDR images, but its shortage is lack of information about
camera calibration, as well as the fact that it is not up-to-date anymore, since
devices have changed rapidly in the past decade. Image properties have
become more complex, starting from the resolution, over camera zooming
and filtering options, to the number of bits used for color representation and
the procedure of image creation.
DEIMOS (DatabasE of Images: Open Source) database [93] was formed
more recently, in 2011, and it contains a large number of different types of
images and videos. At the very beginning, this database contained about 70
HDR images, but it allowed the expansion of this set. In 2015, Korshunov
et al. created a database of 20 HDR images for the purposes of testing
different types of compression methods and performing subjective quality
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assessment of compressed HDR images [97]. Funt et al. created a novel HDR
dataset containing images of 105 scenes [98], providing a larger number of
available images. However, they were all captured using one single device
model - Nikon D700 professional camera. As the images are mostly created
by smartphone devices nowadays, this research did not focus on professional
cameras identification, rather on more commonly used devices.
In 2015, database of 8,156 RAW images named RAISE (RAw ImageS
datasEt) [99] was developed to aid in multimedia forensics detection of fake
images. RAISE includes complete information on image sources and meta-
data, and allows a basic benchmark for analysts to match the images under
observation and arrive at their source of origination. It is also found useful
by researchers who aim to develop detection algorithms as it provides the
basic dataset of images that they can be useful for comparisons.
DML-HDR video database [100] was introduced in 2014, due to the lack of
representative HDR video dataset. DML-HDR consists of five HDR videos,
all captured by professional camera, capable of capturing HDR videos [101].
Stuttgart HDR Video Database [102] contains a slightly bigger number of
recordings, providing a total of 16 HDR videos showing different scenes. This
dataset was formed for the purposes of evaluation of temporal tone mapping
operators and HDR-displays.
Considering the complexity of HDR videos, it is understandable that
currently available datasets include only a small number of them. However,
for the purposes of carrying out the compatible research on video source
identification, a larger number of available HDR videos is needed.
Despite the existence of a number of HDR datasets, none of the previ-
ously mentioned ones was designed for the purposes of testing the possibility
of source identification, which requires a large number of images and videos,
employment of bigger number of capturing devices and some specific cap-
turing conditions, such as the good lighting, off-flash mode and existence of
flat surfaces. This fact has been a motivation for creating the novel datasets
described in the following chapters of this thesis.
Chapter 4
Multimedia forensics based on
sensor noise
Studies have shown that one of the most successful approaches in
source identification procedure is based on camera reference noise
extraction. This chapter aims to describe how can the camera be
identified using its own generated noise and to explain the further
procedure for source identification based on noise extraction.
4.1 Photo-Response Non-Uniformity noise
Each digital camera device or any other capturing device produces so-called
pattern noise. As the name suggests, it is a characteristic noise of each
image capturing sensor, which remains approximately the same on all the
photographs of the same scene captured using that sensor. Two types of
the pattern noise can be differed: Photo-Response Non-Uniformity (PRNU)
noise and Fixed Pattern Noise (FPN). The latter is also called dark cur-
rent noise, because it appears when sensor is not exposed to the light. In
contrast, PRNU is caused by sensor’s reaction to the light and it is a domi-
nant part of the sensor pattern noise. The major PRNU component is Pixel
Non-Uniformity (PNU) noise, which appears due to different sensitivity of
pixels to the light and it has much better resistance to image processing in
comparison to fixed pattern noise collected from the sensor [103]. The other
component contains all the low-frequency defects, caused by the usage of
zooming option, light refraction, etc.
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In order to investigate the characteristics of PNU, as the main part of
PRNU noise, authors in [103] have conducted an experiment on a set of im-
ages of uniformly illuminated surface, captured by the same camera device.
Low frequency components were first filtered and images were averaged after-
wards, which has shown to reduce random noise and accumulate the sensor
pattern noise. Furthermore, the experiment has proved that PNU noise is
suppressed in very dark image areas, leaving FPN noise as a dominant part
of the pattern noise. While PNU noise is not preeminent in case of dark
areas, it cannot exist at all in saturated areas.
4.2 PRNU-based source identification
The first step in source identification using PRNU noise is estimation of
PRNU factor K. In order to make a good estimation, a large number of
images captured by the same digital capturing device is needed. The reason
for this requirement is better random noise suppression, which can increase
reliability of source identification conducted using PRNU method. In case of
video analysis, it is easier to obtain the required number of images, as each
video frame represents an image itself. However, if video recordings are not
available, a large image database of N images is needed, where N should
satisfy condition N > 50 [103]. Although improved PRNU estimators [49]
require a smaller number of images, empirical results available in literature
show that reliability is higher if the larger number N is employed. As it is
shown that the image averaging results in accumulated sensor pattern noise,
the idea is to use a large number of images and to compute their average in
order to get PRNU.
The best results can be obtained if the images are smooth and do not
contain many details. Flat surfaces, such as clear sky or uniformly illumi-
nated flat objects, are the most flattering image contents when it comes to
PRNU factor estimation.
As it is stated in Chapter 2, the adopted model for image camera acqui-
sition is represented by the equation (4.1).
I = gγ × [(1 +K)Y + Λ]γ + Θq (4.1)
The procedure starts with improving Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) in each
employed image from the set of N images, by employing host signal rejec-
tion. This way, the difference between noisy and noiseless parts is enhanced.
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Figure 4.1: Scheme of the noise residual extraction.
After that, filtering process can be performed using wavelet-based denoising
filter [104, 105]. This process results in a denoised image, which is further
used to extract a noise component from the original image. The extraction
can be performed by subtracting the previously computed denoised image
from the original one, as it is shown in Fig. 4.1. The signal left after the
previously described procedure is noise residual W . As it contains enhanced
information about the sensor pattern noise, W is averaged instead of the raw
images.
Partial derivation of the log-likelihood L(K) of ratio WI solved for K
is computed in order to obtain maximum likelihood estimate Kˆ, as it is
described by the relation (4.2). Factor σ2 in the relation denotes variance
of White Gaussian Noise (WGN). Although the real systems contain much
more complex forms of noise, WGN can be accepted as a simplified model
of the noise term, without a significant impact on the results.
δL(K)
δK
=
N∑
k=1
Wk/Ik −K
σ2/(Ik)2
= 0 =⇒ Kˆ =
∑N
k=1WkIk∑N
k=1(Ik)
2
(4.2)
Estimate Kˆ contains a valuable information about the PRNU, but it also
includes some artifacts that are common to multiple cameras, due to the im-
plementation of image formation process and the sensor design itself. Hav-
ing the same characteristics included in the maximum likelihood estimate
of more than one device results in high possibility of false source identi-
fication. Therefore, it is advisable to reduce the unwanted similarities as
much as possible. Suppression of artifacts effect on Kˆ can be performed by
manipulation of pixel values with aim of producing PRNU factor with zero
mean in each row and column of pixels [49]. This method is shown to be
able to reduce color interpolation artifacts, as well as the artifacts produced
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by row-wise and column-wise operations of sensors and processing circuits.
The result is significant reduction of correlation between PRNU factors of
different devices.
In case that the zero mean PRNU factor contains visually identifiable
patterns, it is suggested to translate the processed signal into Fourier domain
and perform Wiener filtering to filter out all the components except from the
noise [49].
Once the PRNU factor is estimated and processed in order to suppress
all the unnecessary information, source identification procedure can begin.
Computed PRNU is a unique stochastic fingerprint of imaging sensor and it
serves as a basis for further procedure. Similar procedure that has been con-
ducted on N images for calculating PRNU has to be conducted on an image
that needs to be classified as the result of capturing by specific capturing
device. The image is first processed to extract the noise which is going to be
correlated with the computed fingerprint.
The problem of image source identification is formulated as a hypothesis
testing with the aim of PRNU detection in the noise residual. As shown
in Fig. 4.2, the zeroth hypothesis H0 is that the noise residual contains
only random noise without any other components, while the first hypothesis
H1 is that there are more components related to the estimate of the same
capturing device, except from the random noise. In other words, if hypothesis
H0 is true, the image that is analyzed over a fingerprint of some capturing
device was not obtained by that device. On the other hand, if hypothesis
H1 is true, analyzed image has the same or similar characteristics as the
images which produced PRNU fingerprint of capturing device, and device is
therefore identified to be the source of the analyzed image.
Mathematical representations of the hypotheses can differ, depending on
the noise model that is taken into consideration. As white Gaussian noise
is the simplest noise type, which does not appear in the real systems, it is
better to operate with more complex ones, such as colored Gaussian noise η.
Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that PRNU factor estimation
Kˆ may be attenuated due to the previously described PRNU processing
procedure. Therefore, if the sensor output model defined by equation (4.1)
is modified in accordance to the previous statements and defined by the
relation (4.3), hypotheses can be formulated as it is presented in relation 4.4.
While T represents pixel-wise multiplicative attenuation factor, X = IKˆ is
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Figure 4.2: Scheme of the image source identification problem formulation:
hypothesis testing with the aim of PRNU detection in the noise residual.
the non-attenuated PRNU factor value [49].
W = TX + η (4.3)
H0 : W = η,H1 : W = TX + η (4.4)
At this stage, attenuation factor T and unequal variances σ2c of Gaussian
variables that form colored Gaussian noise are the unknown variables. Their
estimation is not easy, as each pixel has its own values of the previously
mentioned factors. As it would be computationally and time exhausting to
perform the estimation procedure at each pixel of an image, it is advisable
to divide image into a number of blocks and perform the computations for
each of them. This simplification implies that all the pixels from the same
block have the same values of T and σ2c .
Normalized Generalized Matched Filter (GMF) is the optimal detector
for the problem set up by previously formed hypotheses [49]. It is defined
by relation (4.5), where M is the total number of image blocks. Normalized
correlation between non-attenuated PRNU factor and noise residual can be
derived from this equation. Simplified form is given by the relation (4.6),
where ρb denotes the normalized correlation, which is defined in (4.7). The
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other component βb is defined by relation (4.8).
ρ =
∑M
b=1
Tˆb
σˆ2b
(Xb ×Wb)√∑M
b=1
Tˆ 2b
σˆ2b
||Xb||2
√∑M
b=1
1
σˆ2b
||Wb||2
(4.5)
ρ =
M∑
b=1
βbρb (4.6)
ρb =
Xb ×Wb
||Xb||||Wb|| = corr(Xb,Wb) (4.7)
βb =
Tˆb
σˆ2b
||Xb||||Wb||√∑M
i=1
Tˆ 2i
σˆ2i
||Xi||2
√∑M
i=1
1
σˆ2i
||Wi||2
(4.8)
The problem of estimating values for attenuation factor and variances
of Gaussian variables from the optimal detector requires a known value of
normalized correlation ρb. As it is available only under the hypothesis H1,
predictor of values ρb can be constructed based on the known PRNU factor
estimate and features from the image block of interest, under this hypothe-
sis. Finally, Neyman-Pearson approach can be employed for deciding if the
analyzed image was captured by the device whose fingerprint is used in the
described process, or not.
Due to the dependence of correlation factor on the image size, it is not
suitable parameter for further analysis of the results. Peak to Correlation
Energy ratio (PCE) is a better comparison factor [106] and it can be defined
by the relation (4.9), where speak denotes coordinates of the peak, m and
n are the image dimensions, and M is a small neighborhood around the
peak [106].
PCE =
ρ(speak;X,Y )
2
1
mn−|M|
∑
s/∈M ρ(s;X,Y )2
(4.9)
PCE considers a possible special shift s between the fingerprint and the
noise extracted from the image due to a possible cropping or use of the
image. Then a correlation is conducted for each shift, and if a correlation
prove is found, corresponding shift is considered to give the correct output.
The above described procedure of PRNU-based source identification refers
to images, but having in mind that video represents a sequence of images,
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it is easy to conclude that the same procedure applies to videos, as well. N
images used in process of PRNU factor estimation are video frames in this
case, and they can be extracted from the same video, without need to record
multiple of them, as in case of images.
4.3 Advantages and vulnerabilities of PRNU-
based source identification
Due to the great performances it showed, PRNU-based source identification
became a popular approach in multimedia forensics. However, as all the
other methodologies, approaches and algorithms, source identification based
on PRNU extraction has some vulnerabilities, apart from all the advantages
it provides. This section aims to provide an analysis of both positive and
negative sides of using PRNU fingerprint for multimedia forensic purposes.
Advantages can be summarized in five major categories: stability, gen-
erality, universality, dimensionality and robustness [107]. Regardless of the
physical conditions and time lapse, PRNU fingerprint remains stable, which
represents its first advantage. Since it is contained in every image and every
video file, no matter which source device is used for multimedia acquisition,
PRNU-based source identification follows the generality principle. Having
in mind that all types of sensors exhibit PRNU, it is also universal. Further-
more, dimensionality, or uniqueness, is achieved, due to the large number of
information contained in each fingerprint. Since many features characterize
device’s fingerprint, it is unlikely that they will be similar for two different
sensors. Finally, this approach is robust, because the fingerprint can sur-
vive a wide range of multimedia manipulations, such as filtering and lossy
compression [107].
Disadvantages of PRNU-based methods are computation load and sensi-
tiveness to modifications, or so-called de-synchronization attacks [108]. Hav-
ing in mind that using PRNU fingerprint can lead to the exact source device
identification, it is clear that one of the requirements for such result has to
be familiarity of the identified source device. Since there is a huge amount
of different camera devices, which increases as time lapses, database of in-
formation about the devices and their fingerprints gets larger and larger,
requiring tremendous physical storage [108]. De-synchronization is the other
vulnerability of this method, caused by geometric distortion attacks such
as scaling and cropping, which spatially de-synchronize target PRNU with
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reference PRNU [109]. This problem is investigated and researches came to
the conclusion that using scale- and rotation-invariant transforms [109] or
using the Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test directly in the spatial domain
and finding the maximum of the test statistics using brute force [107] can
help in overcoming this issue.
Taking into account the benefits it offers, vulnerabilities of PRNU-based
approach in source identification are actively explored and research commu-
nity still develops novel, improved algorithms, which suppress the recognized
issues.
Chapter 5
MOSES mobile application for
video dataset collection
For the purposes of video dataset expandability, MOSES mobile
application is presented in this chapter. After description of the
initial dataset, impact of the social media exchange on the origi-
nal video files, as well as the ability of PRNU-based source iden-
tification on the presented dataset are investigated.
5.1 Introduction
As it is addressed in Chapter 3, one of the major problems for the research
community is the lack of convenient and up-to-date datasets which can be
used for multimedia forensic purposes. Having recognized this problem, three
novel datsets of images and videos were created as part of this thesis. First
of them is mobile application named MOSES [5]. The aim of this application
is to provide a video dataset that will contain videos from a large number of
smartphone devices, recorded using different camera specifics and showing a
large span of scenes, with the advantage of being up-to-date.
Initial dataset was made using the implemented application and it con-
tains 1,209 videos captured with 35 different devices. This dataset is expand-
able, because MOSES provides users to capture and upload their own videos
to the dataset stored on the Florence University server. Dataset is currently
not publicly accessible, but it can gain a public access for the researching
purposes.
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Previously described, up-to-date and expandable, video dataset would es-
tablish an excellent test environment for multimedia forensics techniques, es-
pecially in the field of source identification. Unlike the other datasets, which
provide a certain number of files taken under controlled conditions, MOSES
can exceed a large number of video files captured by a various smartphone
devices. Different capturing scenarios can also benefit the investigation pro-
cesses, introducing a big variety of contents.
As video frames are images themselves, this application automatically
provides a large database of images, which is of a special importance for
PRNU estimation used for source identification purposes. Although MOSES
does not initially contain HDR recordings, allowance of dataset expansion
enables users to upload HDR videos, which can easily be transferred in the
sequences of HDR images for the analysis purposes.
5.2 Guide for using the MOSES mobile appli-
cation
Currently, iOS and Android versions of the MOSES application are avail-
able. Android application can be downloaded using the following URL:
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.vmoses.metadata (Fig.
5.1), while iOS version can easily be found under iMoses name in the Italian
Apple store. Readers are invited to download the application and follow stan-
dard installation procedure to contribute in the currently available dataset
expansion. It is worth noting that the Android version is available world-
wide, while its iOS counterpart can now be used only by the Italian users.
The Android graphical user interface for MOSES application is repre-
sented in Fig. 5.2, while Fig. 5.3 represents its iOS GUI.
After installation of MOSES mobile application and starting it, selection
of one of the three scenario types: indoor, outdoor or flat is needed. After
that, user selects one of the three camera motion types. The available choices
are: move, still and panrot. Move refers to the case when a person is walking
while recording a video. In the still movement scenario, video is recorded
by a steady hand, in a still position, while panrot scenario refers to the case
when a video is acquired while standing still, but combining pan-movements
and rotation of the device. Acquisition starts by pressing the RECORD
button, which calls the native camera application, that performs recording.
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Figure 5.1: MOSES application in Google Play Store.
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Figure 5.2: The Android interface for MOSES application [5].
Figure 5.3: The iOS interface for MOSES application.
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Considering the limited storage and bandwidth capacities, duration of
videos that users can record using MOSES is set to 30 seconds. After that
time, user can choose whether to upload a file to the existing dataset or
cancel the procedure. Uploading is performed by pressing the UPLOAD
button, which sends the content via File Transfer Protocol (FTP) to the
servers, without any further processing.
5.3 Implementation details
Besides from offering the ability of recording and storing videos in the dataset,
MOSES collects the available information about camera device from which
the video was recorded. This information is being stored in an XML file,
which is obtained by analyzing the video metadata, and can later be used in
process of source identification. Obtained information are as follows:
• manufacturer,
• operating system and its version,
• model of the device,
• frame rate in fps,
• resolution (video width and height),
• rotation of the display during the acquisition,
• acquisition timestamp (start of recording),
• creation timestamp (time of storing),
• information about video stabilization.
An example of XML metadata is given in Listing 5.1. Although it con-
tains a large variety of information, it is not useful in a form where a quick
analysis of the information cannot be performed. In order to enhance its
usefulness, an SQLite database was created through Java script that stores
the contents of XML files in the form of table, creating database of informa-
tion that can be extracted using SQL queries. In order to perform this, XML
file needs to be parsed to convert the information from the shown structure
to a relational database, which provides the ability to analyze the dataset
more efficiently. SQLite database consists of a single table that contains
information of each XML in a single row.
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Listing 5.1. An example of XML metadata from a video acquired with
MOSES in the Android version [5].
1 <track>
2 ...
3 <bitRate>5255207</bitRate>
4 <captureTime>20170525214034</captureTime>
5 ...
6 <dateCreated>20170525T194047.000Z</dateCreated>
7 <device>
8 <brand>Lenovo</brand>
9 <device>P70-A</device>
10 <deviceID>865897020799766</deviceID>
11 <display>P70-A S138 151020 16G L ROW</display>
12 <manufacturer>LENOVO</manufacturer>
13 <model>Lenovo P70-A</model>
14 <os>
15 <name>LOLLIPOP MR1</name>
16 <release>5.1</release>
17 <sdk>22</sdk>
18 </os>
19 <product>P70-A</product>
20 <user>unknown</user>
21 </device>
22 <duration>5</duration>
23 <frameRate>0.0</frameRate>
24 ...
25 <hasAudio>yes</hasAudio>
26 <hasVideo>yes</hasVideo>
27 <height>720</height>
28 <location>43.7937419,11.2304078</location>
29 <mimeType>video/mp4</mimeType>
30 ...
31 <resolution>921600</resolution>
32 <rotation>90</rotation>
33 <scene>indoor</scene>
34 <movement>flat</movement>
35 <timeSubdivision>00:00:05</timeSubdivision>
36 <title>86589702079976620170525214034 indoor</title>
37 <videoStabilizationMode>0,1</videoStabilizationMode>
38 <width>1280</width>
39 <year>2017</year>
40 </track>
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Figure 5.4: Snapshot of Java script for conversion of XML files to SQLite
database.
Following steps are followed in order to extract data from XML files to
SQLite database table:
• reading XML files,
• parsing XML files,
• inserting data in table.
Java script has been written in order to perform the previously listed
steps. The only input for the script is a path to a dataset of XML files.
The script first reads all the files available in a given path recursively. Once
the reading is done, the script parses a file according to the nodes of XML
file. When the information from XML file is retrieved, script creates an SQL
insert query based on the nodes data and creates a record, i.e. a row in the
database table. A snapshot of Java script is given in Fig. 5.4, while the
fields of SQLite table are shown in Fig. 5.5.
Once the script completes its execution, it produces a result in the form
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Figure 5.5: Partial representation of fields in created SQLite database table.
Figure 5.6: Example of XML files parsed to SQLite database table.
of the one given in Fig. 5.6. This form of a relational database allows user to
easily run queries and get results. Furthermore, aggregated results are easily
producible in a single query in this case, in contrast to a very time-consuming
process in case of raw XML files.
5.4 Initial dataset formation
The initial dataset was created using MOSES application, which was first
downloaded to devices from Google Play and Apple Store applications. All
the recorded videos were then uploaded to the server through the installed
smartphone applications.
Created dataset consists of 622 native videos and 587 videos exchanged
through YouTube social platform, resulting in total of 1,209 videos. Video
exchange had been conducted in order to provide ability for forgery detection
testing using format-based techniques, as well as to provide conducting other
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multimedia forensics tests which rely on MPEG compression. Furthermore,
exchanged videos can be used for analysis of fingerprints inserted by different
social media platforms, which can be useful in provenance analysis of the
shared data. It is worth noting that uploading video and downloading it at
the maximum resolution available is meant by the term exchange.
Obtained videos include both indoor and outdoor scenes, as well as flat
scenes. The latter scenery is provided in order to enable PRNU-based source
identification, due to the needs of this method, described in Chapter 4.
Dataset was created using 35 devices from 11 different manufacturers. The
number of devices per each manufacturer was as follows:
• 13 Apple devices,
• 8 Samsung devices,
• 5 Huawei devices,
• 2 One Plus devices,
• 1 Asus device,
• 1 Lenovo device,
• 1 LG electronics device,
• 1 Microsoft device,
• 1 Sony device,
• 1 Wiko device,
• 1 Xiaomi device.
Previously listed devices use Android and iOS operating systems. Em-
ployed versions of Android operating system span from 5.x to 7.x, while
versions span from 7.x to 10.x for the used iOS-operating devices. Depend-
ing on the device model, camera resolutions are different, and the produced
videos therefore have full HD, HD, or 480p resolution. All of them were
obtained using rear-camera at the maximum resolution possible, with the
exception of Asus device, for which the highest provided resolution was not
employed. The dataset resulted in containing videos from 24 devices that
provided full HD resolution, 9 that produced videos in HD resolution and 2
which provided 480p resolution. Summary of device and video characteris-
tics are given in the Table 5.4, which also provides distinguishing different
device models for those devices who share the same manufacturer. It is worth
noting that the majority of recorded videos last longer than 60 seconds, with
the exception of small number of videos obtained by devices D5 and D27,
which are 25 seconds long. Videos with duration longer than 30 seconds were
allowed in the initial dataset formation, but as it is stated earlier, limitation
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Figure 5.7: Video frame samples from the initial dataset obtained using
MOSES mobile application [5].
of video duration is set afterwards, due to the limited server’s storage.
For the purposes of providing the ability of testing the impact of camera
movements on the recorded videos, each scenario was captured in three dif-
ferent camera motions. As videos are mostly obtained without using tripod,
this case was not included as a test scenario. The first set of recordings was
made in the still camera motion, where only small movements due to still
hand acquisition were present. Recording of the same scene was repeated in
the walking motion, where the person was walking at the time of recording
a video. The third set of videos is recorded while the person recording a
video was standing still and simultaneously combining pan-movement and
rotation of the device. The examples of frames extracted from the recorded
videos are shown in Fig. 5.7.
Having in mind the power of social platforms in today’s world, it is of
a special interest for multimedia forensics to explore their influences on the
original content. Therefore, in addition to the native contents described
above, initial video dataset includes a subset of videos exchanged through
YouTube platform. After creating a YouTube account, native videos were
uploaded into playlists (one playlist has been created for each device) using
the Public flag. Downloading process was carried out by executing youtube-
dl 6 command-line free software. Related playlist was downloaded for each
of the employed devices by selecting the best possible resolution. Using the
above mentioned software, this can be performed by specifying the following
parameter: -f 137+140/bestvideo+bestaudio. Exchanged videos were stored
in the dataset afterwards.
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Table 5.1: Main features of the devices employed in initial MOSES dataset
and video files obtained by them [5].
Brand Model ID Video resolution #Videos
Apple iPad 2 D13 1280× 720 16
Apple iPad mini D20 1920× 1080 16
Apple iPhone 4 D09 1280× 720 19
Apple iPhone 4S D02 1920× 1080 13
Apple iPhone 4S D10 1920× 1080 15
Apple iPhone 5 D29 1920× 1080 19
Apple iPhone 5 D34 1920× 1080 18
Apple iPhone 5c D05 1920× 1080 19
Apple iPhone 5c D14 1920× 1080 19
Apple iPhone 5c D18 1920× 1080 13
Apple iPhone 6 D06 1920× 1080 15
Apple iPhone 6 D15 1920× 1080 18
Apple iPhone 6 Plus D19 1920× 1080 19
Asus Zenfone 2 Laser D23* 640× 480 19
Huawei Ascend G6-U10 D33 1280× 720 18
Huawei Honor 5C NEM-L51 D30 1920× 1080 19
Huawei P8 GRA-L09 D28 1920× 1080 19
Huawei P9 EVA-L09 D03 1920× 1080 19
Huawei P9 Lite VNS-L31 D16 1920× 1080 19
Lenovo Lenovo P70-A D07 1280× 720 19
LG electronics D290 D04 800× 480 19
Microsoft Lumia 640 LTE D17 1920× 1080 10
OnePlus A3000 D25 1920× 1080 19
OnePlus A3003 D32 1920× 1080 19
Samsung Galaxy S III Mini GT-I8190 D26 1280× 720 16
Samsung Galaxy S III Mini GT-I8190N D01 1280× 720 16
Samsung Galaxy S3 GT-I9300 D11 1920× 1080 19
Samsung Galaxy S4 Mini GT-I9195 D31 1920× 1080 19
Samsung Galaxy S5 SM-G900F D27 1920× 1080 19
Samsung Galaxy Tab 3 GT-P5210 D08 1280× 720 34
Samsung Galaxy Tab A SM-T555 D35 1280× 720 16
Samsung Galaxy Trend Plus GT-S7580 D22 1280× 720 16
Sony Xperia Z1 Compact D5503 D12 1920× 1080 19
Wiko Ridge 4G D21 1920× 1080 19
Xiaomi Redmi Note 3 D24 1920× 1080 19
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5.5 Experiments
The experiment was conducted using the obtained video files to perform
source identification based on PRNU noise. For those purposes, the same
procedure described in detail in Chapter 4 was conducted.
Camera fingerprint was first estimated from the first 100 frames of a
referent flat video in panrot camera motion. Performing the same algorithm,
fingerprint was afterwards estimated for the query video, as well, using its
available frames. PCE factor was then calculated for the query video and
compared to the threshold value of originating to the examined source device
or not. All the available matching cases (videos from the same device) and
the same number of mismatching cases (videos randomly chosen from other
devices) were considered.
In order to investigate if the compression introduced by exchanging videos
through YouTube platform influences the result of source identification, ex-
periments were run on both original and exchanged video files.
5.6 Results
The achieved results are shown in the form of ROC curve in Fig. 5.8. This
figure represents true positive (TP) and false alarm (FA) rates compared at
varying thresholds. This kind of results representation allows quantification
of the performance drop when YouTube compression was involved in the
process.
It can be noticed that the results are not as good as expected, considering
usually very good performances of PRNU-based methods in source identi-
fication, especially in case of original multimedia files. The possible reason
for results degradation is the fact that several employed devices contain in-
camera digital stabilization, which has a negative impact on fingerprints
alignment during the process of its estimation. Therefore, the experiment
was repeated using only devices without this feature. The obtained results
for this case are shown in Fig. 5.9.
Experiment which excluded devices with in-camera digital stabilization
has produced better results for both native and YouTube exchanged videos.
This confirms the assumption that the previously mentioned feature intro-
duces some difficulties in the PRNU-based source identification. Therefore,
it is important to take this characteristic into account when performing tech-
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Figure 5.8: ROC curve of video source identification performances on native
and YouTube exchanged videos [5].
Figure 5.9: ROC curve of video source identification performances on na-
tive and YouTube exchanged videos with limitation of the analysis to non-
stabilized videos [5].
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niques for identification of video source device.
However, YouTube exchanged videos showed relatively low TP rate even
in case when only devices without in-built digital stabilization were em-
ployed. While native videos were shown to have TP rate in the range from
0,94 to 1, TP rate of the exchanged videos dropped even to 0,58 in some
cases. This result leads to the conclusion that exchanged videos are harder
to trace to their original source device. Moreover, it confirms the assumption
that social media platforms induce their own fingerprint to the exchanged
content, which makes it different from the original. This fact opens up an in-
teresting topic of types and characteristics of the marks created by different
social media platform and their possible recognizability, which should be fur-
ther investigated. MOSES mobile application provides research community
a large span of videos which can be used for these purposes.
Chapter 6
VISION dataset
A novel dataset of images and videos is presented in this chapter.
Having different types of multimedia files obtained by the same
devices, VISION dataset provides investigation of differences be-
tween PRNU estimates obtained using image and video files. Be-
sides from the estimation analysis, the chapter describes results
of source identification based on PRNU estimates and impact of
the social media exchange on the original files.
6.1 Introduction
Motivated by the results and derived conclusions after conducting the source
identification analysis on initial MOSES video dataset, described in Chapter
5, a novel database including both images and videos exchanged through the
social network platforms was created. The dataset is named VISION and its
characteristics are described in more detail in this chapter.
Creation of a novel dataset of images and videos was performed due to the
lack of an adequate dataset of this type, which can be used for source iden-
tification purposes. Although many image and video databases are available
in state-of-the-art, as described in Section 3.4, to the best of our knowl-
edge, none of them is up-to-date database with large variety of scenarios
and multimedia types acquired by diverse modern smartphone devices.
One of the largest and newest datasets which includes both images and
videos is IARPA Janus Benchmark-B Face Dataset, presented in [110]. How-
ever, as the dataset’s name suggests, it is designed for the face analysis and
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therefore includes relatively similar scenery in all the included multimedia
files. Since there is an assumption that most of the source identification algo-
rithms, including PRNU-based method, depend on an image/video content
at some extent, this kind of database is not adequate for source identification
purposes, even though it includes a large number of multimedia files, having
21,798 still images and 7,011 videos.
DEIMOS (DatabasE of Images: Open Source) database [93] is expand-
able set of images and videos, briefly described in Section 3.4. Although this
dataset includes variety of scenes, not many of the multimedia files included
are acquired by modern smartphone devices, especially in HDR mode. Hav-
ing in mind that HDR capturing and recording options gets more and more
popular with the abilities provided by the newest capturing and recording
devices, it is of a big importance for multimedia forensics to have an access
to a large variety of such multimedia.
Furthermore, none of the known image and video datasets include both
regular, spontaneously obtained multimedia files, taken in different condi-
tions and using different scenarios and a large number of flattish, untextured
surfaces, which could enable better PRNU estimation. Considering all the
obstacles encountered analyzing state-of-the-art databases, a novel database
named VISION was created. This database provides both image and video
files in standard and HDR mode, as well as a large variety of captured
and recorded scenes, including flattish, monotonous surfaces, convenient for
PRNU-based methods.
Using VISION, multimedia forensics tests based on PRNU factor estima-
tion for source identification were run in order to investigate the impact of
social media platform exchange on the obtained images. The analysis also
includes comparison of PRNU factors estimated from video frames and from
images acquired by the same devices. PRNU factors estimated from different
multimedia types are usually hard to match, which can represent a problem
in source identification field. Therefore, this analysis can show dependability
of PRNU factor on the multimedia files used for its estimation. Considering
that both original (generic, native) images and videos, as well as their ex-
changed counterparts are included in the analysis, influence of compression
procedures can also be investigated in this case.
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Figure 6.1: Structural organization of VISION dataset [6].
6.2 Dataset formation
VISION dataset employs all 35 devices used for creation of initial videos
included in MOSES application. For the purposes of image capturing and
video recording, the best-quality camera available was employed. While the
structure of video part of the dataset remained the same as for the MOSES,
including three types of recorded scenarios (indoor, outdoor and flat), image
part of the dataset included two scenarios: flat and nat. Flat scenario implies
captures of flattish, uniform surfaces, such as walls or skies, just as it was case
for the same scenario in the video part of the dataset. On the other hand,
nat scenario involves both indoor and outdoor scenes. The abbreviation
nat refers to native, original images. Separation of the images based on the
environment they were captured in (indoor or outdoor) was not performed
in this case. Furthermore, three camera motions: still, moving and panrot
available in MOSES application are available in videos part of the VISION
dataset, making it compatible with MOSES-obtained videos.
Total of 11,732 native images were collected for the purposes of VISION
dataset creation. 7,565 of them were shared through Facebook, in both high
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and low quality, as well as through WhatsApp. This resulted in a total of
34,427 images. It is worth noting that HDR images were obtained from
devices which have had the ability of HDR capturing, while the remaining
images were obtained in standard SDR mode provided by other employed de-
vices. For the purposes of videos collection, 648 originals were recorded. 622
of them were also shared through YouTube at the maximum available resolu-
tion, while 644 originals were shared through WhatsApp, resulting in a total
of 1,914 videos. It should be noted that images and videos shared through
social media platforms were rescaled by them, leading to lower multimedia
files resolutions than the ones shown in Table 6.1 for original multimedia.
The structure of VISION dataset is shown in Fig. 6.1. The obtained im-
ages and videos were first sorted by the device model, then after the obtained
multimedia type (image or video), and finally, by categories implying the sce-
narios in which the files were obtained. The explanation of each category
name is given below:
• flat in images category: images of flat scenes,
• nat : native images including both indoor and outdoor scenes,
• natFBH : native images exchanged through Facebook platform in high
quality,
• natFBL: native images exchanged through Facebook platform in low
quality,
• natWA: native images exchanged through WhatsApp platform,
• flat in videos category: videos of flat scenes,
• indoor : videos recorded in the indoor environment,
• outdoor : videos recorded in the outdoor environment,
• flatYT : videos of flat scenes exchanged through YouTube in high qual-
ity,
• indoorYT : videos recorded in the indoor environment exchanged through
YouTube platform in high quality,
• outdoorYT : videos recorded in the outdoor environment exchanged
through YouTube platform in high quality,
• flatWA: videos of flat scenes exchanged through WhatsApp,
• indoorWA: videos recorded in the indoor environment exchanged through
WhatsApp,
• outdoorWA: videos recorded in the outdoor environment exchanged
through WhatsApp.
Summarized features of the complete dataset are provided in Table 6.1.
6.2 Dataset formation 59
As it can be seen from the table, duration of videos obtained in this dataset
is much shorter in comparison to the duration of videos from initial MOSES
dataset. Moreover, it should be noticed that this research takes into account
some of the inherit camera device characteristics, such as the ability of au-
tomatic digital stabilization and HDR capturing. Special attention should
be paid on differences between image and video resolutions, although both
types of files were captured and recorded by the very same devices, using
the same camera and its configuration.
The example of images included in the VISION dataset is shown in Fig.
6.2. Differences in image and video resolutions were the main cause of PRNU
factor estimate nonconformity, which was investigated afterwards and is de-
scribed in the following sections.
6.2.1 Multimedia files exchange through social media
platforms
For the purposes of exchanging images through Facebook, two photo-albums
were opened on this social platform. Both of them were used only for nat
images, but one of the albums contained images uploaded in low quality
(natFBL), while the other one contained their counterparts uploaded in high
quality (natFBH ). Uploading processes significantly differ for these two qual-
ity levels, due to different compression methods employed, which is explained
in detail in [111].
Downloading images was performed in two different manners: single im-
age and a whole album. This test has been conducted in order to explore
if the internally set downloading processes differ for these two cases. It was
shown that there is no difference between the downloaded contents.
The exchanged images were saved in the same format as the originals and
they follow the analogous naming convention, thus providing that the na-
tive image and its exchanged counterpart can be immediately recognized.
For example, the first native image captured by D01 device was named
D01 I nat 0001.jpg, while the same image exchanged through the Facebook
platform with high quality upload was named D01 I natFBH 0001.jpg. It is
easily noticeable that the format of storing was deviceID multimediaType
sceneType ordinalNumber.fileFormat. Variable deviceID takes a value from
the ID tab of the Table 6.1, while multimediaType can be set to ”I” or ”V”,
which stands for image and video, respectively. Argument sceneType can
take any value from the last branch of the dataset structure hiererarchy rep-
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Figure 6.2: Samples of images from the VISION dataset [6].
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resented in Fig. 6.1. Finally, ordinalNumber represents the ordinal number
of multimedia file captured or recorded by the device with specified devi-
ceID, while fileFormat represents a format in which the images or videos
were stored by the concrete device. The most common value of fileFormat
for images is JPEG, while MPEG is most frequently used format for videos.
It is important to note that the previously described naming convention
includes one more parameter in case of videos, because they were obtained
using three different camera motions and can be sorted thereafter. For ex-
ample, if the previously mentioned device D01 had recorded a video of indoor
scenario, using panrot camera motion, stored as a fifth file, its name would
have been D01 I indoor panrot 0005.mpeg.
YouTube web platform was used for uploading and downloading original
videos obtained by the employed camera devices. This process is referred
to as exchanging, just as it was case for images. Exchanging was performed
in the same manner as it was conducted for the purposes of creating initial
video dataset for MOSES mobile application. Public privacy flag was used
for uploading in the high resolution mode.
Besides from youtube-dl tool used in case of downloading the exchanged
videos obtained by MOSES application, ClipGrab1 tool was employed in
order to investigate are there any differences between the resulting contents
in case of downloading using two different tools. Previously mentioned tools
produced the same downloading results.
Except from the Facebook and YouTube web platforms, WhatsApp mo-
bile application was employed for exchanging both image and video files. All
the multimedia files included in this process were exchanged via WhatsApp
v2.17.41, using an iPhone7 A1778 device with iOS v10.3.1. The reason for
choosing mobile application instead of a desktop one in this case is that
the latter does not make compression computations during the exchange
process, while the mobile one does. An interesting fact about WhatsApp
exchanging processes is that they differ in regards to the device type. For
example, iPhone devices obtain a less compressed multimedia file in the ex-
change process, in comparison to the Android devices. In case of images, this
level of compression can be placed somewhere in the range between com-
pression achieved by using low and high quality image uploading through
the Facebook platform. Taking that into account, by transferring image
files over WhatsApp in addition to the previously two exchanging methods
1ClipGrab v3.6.3, available on URL: www.clipgrab.org
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which used Facebook as a social media platform, results from a large span
of processing methods performed on the same set of images were obtained.
Furthermore, as YouTube and WhatsApp do not use the same compression
methods, diversity of processing methods was provided for the video files, as
well.
6.3 Experiments and results
The introduced VISION dataset was used for multimedia forensics test eval-
uations in the similar manner as it was performed using the initial dataset
created for MOSES mobile application. In other words, source identifica-
tion based on PRNU fingerprint estimation was performed using obtained
multimedia files. One of the differences between the previously conducted
experiments and the ones whose execution was provided by VISION dataset
is a larger number of differently processed images and videos, in comparison
to the dataset used in the experiments described in the previous chapter.
Moreover, VISION gives the ability of PRNU factor estimates comparison.
As this dataset contains both images and videos acquired from the same
source devices, it provides the opportunity to investigate the differences be-
tween the estimations produced using video frames and using image files.
Fingerprint computation for each source was conducted using the well-
known PRNU method on flat multimedia files. Single image and video files
were then processed in order to estimate their fingerprints and conduct source
identification based on the obtained PCE values. For each device of interest,
two fingerprints were computed: one based on 100 images obtained from
that device and the other based on the first 100 frames recorded by the
same. For each device, all available matching cases (images/videos from
the same device) and the same number of mismatching cases (images/videos
randomly chosen from other devices) were considered.
6.3.1 Image and video source identification
In the case of images, four experiments were performed for source identifi-
cation purposes. Each of them employed different types of images: native,
WhatsApp exchanged, Facebook high-quality exchanged, and Facebook low-
quality exchanged, as shown in Fig. 6.3. The results obtained by the exper-
iments execution are shown in Fig. 6.4, in the form of ROC curve of true
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Figure 6.3: Scheme of image source identification using VISION.
positive against false alarm rate. It can be seen from the figure that the
worst results were obtained using Facebook low-quality exchanged images,
which implies that the compression used in this case of image transfer has a
large impact on the ability of reliable source identification. Results for the
other three types of images were relatively close and were slightly better for
the case of native, natural images, in comparison to the other ones employed.
As it was shown in the previous chapter that digital stabilization highly
affects the results of source identification in the case when videos are pro-
cessed, the experiment was repeated on the video dataset provided by VI-
SION, in order to check the behavior of different videos included in the
analysis. Scheme of video source identification using VISION is shown in
Fig. 6.5. The results when videos from all the employed devices were used is
shown in Fig. 6.6, while Fig. 6.7 provides the results obtained for the case
when devices which inherently provide automatic stabilization were excluded
from the analysis. The repeated experiment has confirmed the conclusions
derived using initial MOSES video dataset: performances strongly drop when
digitally stabilized videos are involved.
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Figure 6.4: ROC curve of image source identification performances on native,
WhatsApp exchanged, Facebook high-quality exchanged, and Facebook low-
quality exchanged images [6].
Figure 6.5: Scheme of video source identification using VISION.
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Figure 6.6: ROC curve of video source identification performances on native,
YouTube exchanged and WhatsApp exchanged videos [6].
Figure 6.7: ROC curve of video source identification performances on na-
tive, YouTube exchanged and WhatsApp exchanged videos, excluding de-
vices with automatic digital stabilization [6].
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6.3.2 Source Pattern Noise fingerprint comparison: im-
ages vs. videos
Most of the state-of-the-art researches focus only on image or video source
identification, but not both, even in cases of available datasets of both of
these types of multimedia files. The reason for that is the fact that finger-
prints computed using images and videos from the same devices are highly
different. Even if the imaging sensor is the same, videos are usually acquired
at a much lower resolution than images. While today’s smartphones can eas-
ily capture 20-megapixel images, 4K video resolution is the highest reachable
one. For the comparison purposes, 4K video has 8 megapixels per frame.
Having different maximum possible resolutions for images and videos
acquired by the same camera implies having different processes of their ac-
quisition. When recording a video, central crop is first carried to adapt the
sensor size to the desired aspect ratio, which is commonly 16:9. Selected pix-
els are scaled to match the desired video resolution afterwards. This process
introduces fingerprint changes, because scaling and other geometrical opera-
tions generally affect PRNU-based fingerprint, regardless of multimedia type
of interest. Since the process of image acquisition does not require central
crop and scaling, it is justified that fingerprints are different for images and
videos acquired from the same device.
In case of source identification when both images and videos acquired
by the same source device are taken into account, fingerprints of different
multimedia need to be adjusted in order to correctly identify source device.
For those purposes, image-based and video-based fingerprints are linked by
cropping and scaling factors between image and video sensor portion, which
usually changes across different device models [6]. The authors in [112]
investigated and described the geometrical relation between image and video
acquisition processes, which explains this procedure. We invite reader to
find more details about it in the aforementioned paper. Procedure described
in [112] is used in so-called Hybrid Source Identification (HSI) approach,
which combines image- and video-based fingerprints.
For the purposes of supporting HSI approach in the analysis conducted in
this thesis, cropping and scaling factors for linking the corresponding finger-
prints were estimated for several devices. Non-stabilized devices were chosen
for this analysis, due to the complexity of devices with the automatic digital
stabilization. Estimation was performed on flat types of images and videos
from VISION dataset. After computation of reference fingerprint, based
68 VISION dataset
Table 6.2: Estimated cropping and scaling factors for non-stabilized videos
from VISION dataset [6].
ID D01 D03 D07 D08 D09 D11 D13 D16 D17 D21
Scaling 0.5 0.48 0.27 1 0.61 0.59 1 0.46 0.59 n.a.
Cropping
[x y]
[0 228] [0 372] [0 7] [408 354] [227 411] [0 307] [-160 0] [8 396] [0 1] n.a.
ID D24 D26 D27 D28 D30 D31 D32 D33 D35 D22
Scaling 0.5 n.a. 0.5 0.36 0.47 0.46 0.59 0.52 0.39 0.49
Cropping
[x y]
[0 240] n.a. [0 228] [0 0] [39 10] [9 397] [0 0] [464 693] [0 306] [0 246]
on 100 images and the same number of video frames, cropping and scaling
factors were estimated by brute force search, as suggested in [107]. This
approach was used in order to avoid de-synchronization attacks, described
as a well-known vulnerability of PRNU-based approach in Section 4.3.
The obtained results are shown in Table 6.2. In case the obtained max-
imum PCE was lower than the threshold value, the parameter search is
considered unsuccessful and denoted as ”n.a.” in the table. Threshold value
was accepted to be equal to 45, as it is proposed in [49], due to the obtained
empirical results.
It is worth noting that cropping factor is represented in the form of co-
ordinates of corresponding cropping corner, which is the upper-left corner
along x and y axes. The reported scaling factors and cropping corners rep-
resent the values which cause yielding to the maximum PCE for examined
devices. For example, the information given in Table 6.2 can be read as
follows: device D07 showed the best performances in terms of PCE values
when its fingerprint was scaled for the factor of 0.27 and then cropped on
the upper-left side by 7 pixels along the y axis.
Chapter 7
PRNU-based source
identification using HDR images
This chapter presents a novel dataset of HDR and SDR images
and tests the performances of well-known PRNU-based source
identification algorithm. Analysis in terms of image and finger-
print type, as well as reliability of source identification using this
method are presented. PCE optimization algorithm is finally pro-
posed in the last section of the chapter.
7.1 Dataset formation
The procedure conducted during the process of creation VISION dataset [6]
is adopted for the novel dataset of HDR images. As in VISION, camera
that provides the best quality, usually located at the back side of the mobile
device, was used for capturing in case of all the used devices.
A novel dataset of HDR and SDR images was created using 23 different
portable devices, including Huawei, Apple, Samsung, Xiaomi, Asus, Gionee
and One Plus. Devices were configured for capturing in default camera
mode. In case of Apple devices, default mode is usually the one that provides
the highest quality and resolution available, while that is not necessarily
a rule for Android devices. Captures were taken without using flash, in
different atmospheres, including both indoor and outdoor scenes. Twenty
three models of mobile devices produced by seven different manufacturers
were employed. Besides HDR images, created dataset contains standard
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SDR images captured by the same devices, in order to enable comparison of
PRNU-based source identification between different image types.
Conducted research took into account different possibilities of capturing
motions in order to investigate the possible impacts of the pixel artifacts
caused by the camera shake on the PRNU estimation and the final source
identification. Therefore, the introduced dataset contains images captured
using tripod, by a steady hand, and by a shaky hand.
The number of used devices per each manufacturer is as follows:
• 7 Huawei devices,
• 6 Apple devices,
• 4 Samsung devices,
• 3 Xiaomi devices,
• 1 Asus device,
• 1 Gionee device,
• 1 One Plus device.
Seventeen of the employed devices use Android operating system (OS), while
the remaining six operate using iOS. Characteristics of the devices can be
seen in Table 7.1, which also provides information about the resolution of
captured images, their number in accordance to the type (SDR or HDR), and
camera movement mode at the time of capturing. Information listed in the
table are sorted by brands, and then ordered by models, from the oldest to
the newest. Devices are shortly named based on their operating system, e.g.
”A” stands for the device that uses Android, while ”I” represents the device
that uses iOS operating system. Captures were named descriptively, follow-
ing the format ”device category movement number”. Abbreviated name of
the device model is represented by the ”device”, ”category” refers to the
image type: HDR or SDR, ”movement” describes the camera movements,
which can be TRIPOD, HAND or SHAKING, while ”number” represents the
ordinal number of the captured image for the device of interest. More infor-
mation about the meaning of each camera movement type will be provided
in the remainder of this section.
Dataset structure is shown in Fig. 7.1. All the captures were first di-
vided into two groups: FLAT and NAT images. The term FLAT refers to
the images of flattish, monotonous surfaces, such as walls and skies, which
are valuable for PRNU estimation, detection, and the final source identi-
fication using PRNU factor. The other category, NAT, consists of images
of natural scenes, which can be very detailed, textured, colorful and with
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large illumination alternations. FLAT set of images wes created in order
to enable PRNU extraction, while NAT images represent a set of real-case
scenario images, whose source camera identification could be needed.
As the images were captured in both SDR and HDR mode, they can
be further classified in accordance to their type. For the case of NAT set,
it is useful to differ images based on camera movements that occurred at
the time of capturing. They were therefore sorted as shown in Fig. 7.1.
Naming convention used for the movements description is intuitive, where
TRIPOD stands for the images captured when camera device is fixed on the
tripod, HAND category contains the images taken by hand, while SHAKING
category involves images captured by shaky hand. Tripod enables camera
steadiness, which minimizes possibility of pixel artifacts. On the other hand,
captures taken by steady hand include only small pixel artifacts, mostly
invisible to the human eye. Blurring effect becomes visible if the capturing is
performed while shaking a camera device, due to the pixel shifting. As HDR
images are created as a combination of multiple SDR captures, it is expected
that the artifacts will be accentuated and make the source identification
procedure more difficult.
The examples of captures are given in Fig. 7.2.
7.2 Experiments
7.2.1 Fingerprint computation
Camera fingerprints were computed based on PRNU estimation for all 23
devices employed in the novel dataset. For the purposes of testing the quality
of PRNU estimation, three fingerprints were produced for each device, based
on different sets of flat images.
The first group of fingerprints was computed using flat HDR images,
where the number of images deviated from 50 to 87 for different devices. As
the improved method for PRNU factor estimation requires at least 30 im-
ages [49] for successful procedure conduction, the chosen number of images
employed in the analysis ensures reliable estimation results. Considering the
specifics of HDR images, it is expected that source identification based on
PRNU factor would produce better results when both fingerprint of the de-
vice and the image taken by the same are of HDR type. Analogy applies to
the SDR images. In order to test this assumption, second group of finger-
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Figure 7.1: The dataset structure.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
(g) (h)
Figure 7.2: Sample pictures from the Dataset: (a) SDR FLAT, (b) HDR
FLAT, (c) SDR TRIPOD, (d) HDR TRIPOD, (e) SDR SHAKING, (f) HDR
SHAKING, (g) SDR HAND, (h) HDR HAND.
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prints was calculated from the set of 50 to 59 flat SDR images, where the
concrete number of images differed between the devices.
Finally, mixing SDR and HDR images, a group of captures called MIX
was formed. Including both types of images of interest, MIX category pro-
vides the most reliable results for source identification, considering that it
is not common in the real-case scenario that users possess an information
about the image properties. Fingerprints from MIX set were obtained using
100 to 137 images per device, thus ensuring even higher reliability of the
fingerprint estimation results.
7.2.2 Test images processing
Camera photo response non-uniformity detector was obtained using the gen-
eralized likelihood test based on cross-correlation maximization. Following
the PRNU procedure presented in Chapter 4, test images from the NAT part
of the dataset were processed. After the noise extraction was performed, it
was correlated with the PRNU factor estimate, in accordance to relation 4.7.
Maximum of the normalized correlation ρb is considered to be a good ap-
proximation of the generalized likelihood ratio test [113] and it was therefore
computed.
7.2.3 Parameter of comparison
Peak to Correlation Energy (PCE) ratio was used in the experiments as the
measure of relevance of PRNU-based source identification. It was computed
over all the images acquired by the device of interest and values for single
images were compared to the threshold value that separates acceptance of
hypotheses H0 and H1. Threshold value was accepted to be equal to 45, as
it is proposed in [49], due to the obtained empirical results. For more details
about choosing the threshold value, we invite readers to refer to the analysis
conducted in [49]. If the value was higher than threshold, hypothesis H1
(matching image for the source device) was accepted. Otherwise, accepted
hypothesis was H0 (non-matching image for the source device).
It is worth noting that PCE computation was performed for all the an-
alyzed images captured by a certain camera model, and was subsequently
averaged. Results have shown that averaged PCE was less prone to result
variations and camera movements have had less impact on the results in the
case of using this parameter.
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Figure 7.3: The framework of PRNU-based algorithm.
The framework of PRNU-based algorithm is shown in Fig. 7.3.
7.3 Results
This section provides description of multiple stages of analysis during the
process of final PRNU-based source identification. Since two type of images
were used, the one with the standard dynamic range - SDR, and the one
with wider dynamic range - HDR, the first aim was to conclude if there is
a noticeable difference between the types of the images. The analysis was
further expanded on the fingerprints created from multiple images of the
same type, as well as on the groups of images of different types. This step
was conducted with the same purpose of revealing the differences between
SDR and HDR captures and to finally conclude if their fingerprints converge
to the same result, or they differ despite numerous images captured by the
same device were included in the analysis. During the analysis, the impact
of image and fingerprint types, as well as the impact of motions occurred in
the time of image capturing were observed.
After the first step of types and fingerprints difference recognition, there
was a need of analyzing PCE values produced for single devices. The aim was
to find a reason for low PCE values for single images or a set of images and
to find the correlation between the images with low PCE values, if the one
exists. The final step of the analysis deals with the problem of defining how
reliable were the produced results for source identification and the methods
for the reliability increase.
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7.3.1 Analysis in terms of image type: SDR vs. HDR
Theoretical introduction to differences between SDR and HDR images is
provided in the previous chapters. Following that knowledge, correlation
was first computed between the noise extracted from SDR image and finger-
print computed on multiple images of SDR type. Analogously, correlation
was computed between HDR-based components. This experiment was con-
ducted in order to define if the complexity of HDR images creation is an
aggravating factor in PRNU-based source identification. Furthermore, it
aimed to determine the difference between SDR and HDR images in terms
of digital image processing procedure.
Correlation of noise, extracted from SDR images, with flat SDR-based
fingerprint resulted in generally higher PCE values in comparison to the
case when noise from HDR images was employed. The results can be seen in
Fig. 7.3.1-7.7. Android devices A01-A06 have shown the biggest difference
between PCE values in case when the captures were taken by a tripod.
While results obtained for SDRs correlation were characterized with high
PCE values in that case, PCEs of most of the HDRs were low. In some
cases, they were even below the threshold. Difference in terms of higher
PCE value for SDRs in comparison to HDRs is noticeable in the case of
captures taken by steady hand, as well. In case of captures made by shaky
hand, analogy to the previous two cases cannot be applied. While devices
A02, A04 and A05 were shown to have similar PCE values for both cases,
when noise is extracted from SDR and HDR images, the other half of the
devices was shown to have higher PCE values when SDR components are
correlated.
Similar results were obtained with devices A07-A17. Differences between
PCE values of SDR and HDR images were not as emphasized as for the
previously considered set of devices, rather minor in case of devices A07-
A10. On the other hand, A11-A17 followed the same behavior as A01-
A06 devices. Images captured by shaky hand did not show to follow any
pattern. While PCEs were similar for devices A08-A11 and A15, they were
distinctively higher for SDR than HDR images captured by other devices
from the analyzed set.
Finally, iPhone devices I01-I06 have shown to obtain similar PCE values
for both of the image types, regardless of the camera motion. While PCE
values computed during the analysis of SDR images coming from devices I02-
I06 were slightly higher than the ones corresponding to the HDR images, I01
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Figure 7.4: PCE values obtained by SDR and HDR images when compared
with a flat SDR - based fingerprint (devices A01-A06).
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Figure 7.5: PCE values obtained by SDR and HDR images when compared
with a flat SDR - based fingerprint (devices A07-A12).
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Figure 7.6: PCE values obtained by SDR and HDR images when compared
with a flat SDR - based fingerprint (devices A13-A17).
7.3 Results 81
Figure 7.7: PCE values obtained by SDR and HDR images when compared
with a flat SDR - based fingerprint (devices I01-I06).
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device has shown the unexpected results. With this device, PCE values for
images captured by steady and by shaky hand are shown to be higher for
HDR images correlated with the SDR-based fingerprint.
At this stage of analysis, it is already noticeable that camera motions
have an impact on the image noise. However, the results did not show the
best performances in case of complete steadiness during the image capturing,
nor that the motions have the same impact on all the devices. Taking into
account different possibilities of image creation and different types of imaging
sensors, it is expected to obtain results that cannot be generalized to all the
camera devices.
The analysis was further conducted by comparison of PCE values when
noise from SDR and HDR images was correlated with HDR-based finger-
print. Results are shown in Fig. ??. All the devices have shown the analo-
gous behavior as the previously described one. It was noted that the majority
of PCE values obtained by correlation of two image components (noise and
fingerprint) of the same type was higher than the threshold value, while cor-
relation of components of different types results in high or low PCE values,
depending on the employed camera device. This fact lead to the conclu-
sion that manufacturers choice of camera hardware has a great impact on
possibility and reliability of PRNU-based source identification.
It is worth to show and to discuss the atypical result cases. An example
obtained by a single I02 device is shown in Fig. 7.12. It is noticeable that
PCE values of HDR images captured by this device model were above the
threshold value for all the tested images, when they were correlated with
the fingerprint of SDR set of images. This occurred regardless of the camera
movements. Similar was obtained by employing SDR images captured by
completely different device model, A07, and correlating the relevant noise
to fingerprint of HDR images. Obtained result is given in Fig. 7.13. These
two examples show that some of the devices can be identified easier than
others, and that the correct identification of those devices can be provided
regardless of the type (HDR or SDR) of the images. On the other hand,
most of the devices have shown significantly different PCE values of images,
depending on their type.
7.3.2 Analysis in terms of fingerprint type
Previous section describes the analysis which focuses on the impact of single
image type on the obtained results. While fingerprints were the constant,
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referent components of analysis, sets of images belonging to different de-
vices were variables. On the other hand, this section analyses the impact of
different fingerprints on the same sets of images.
Comparing results shown in figures 7.3.1-7.7 with 7.3.1-7.11 for the same
set of devices, it is noticeable that SDR images have had higher PCE value
when HDR-based fingerprint was employed in case of A01, A05, I01 and I03
devices, for all three motion scenarios. Difference in terms of PCE value
enhancement in case of motion change cannot be seen for these devices. On
the other hand, images captured by devices A11, A15 and A17 have had
significantly higher PCE value when the noise extracted from SDR images
was correlated with SDR-based fingerprint. Images captured by all the other
devices were shown to have similar PCE values for both of the fingerprints.
Therefore, only seven of the employed devices were shown to have a no-
ticeable impact of fingerprint on the obtained results. This lead us to the
conclusion that a combination of bigger number of images, regardless of their
type, can suppress the anomalies and specific characteristics of different im-
age types to produce a reliable PRNU estimate in case of most of the devices.
It is assumed that PRNU estimate converges to the same estimation result
in case of both HDR and SDR images for these devices.
To confirm the previous statement, analysis of fingerprint impact on PCE
values was performed for HDR images, as well. It was shown that images
from devices A11 and A15 have had higher PCE values in correlation to SDR-
based fingerprint. While A11 device showed no differences in the amount of
PCE improvement for different motion scenarios, images from A15 device
have had significantly higher PCE in case of capturing by shaky hand. Im-
provements were noticeable for images captured using tripod, but there were
no differences in case of images captured by steady hand. In contrast to the
previously mentioned devices, A01, A17, I01 and I03 have had better per-
formances when the noise extracted from their HDR images was correlated
with corresponding HDR-based fingerprint. Differences in terms of camera
motions were not noticeable in these cases. All the other employed devices
were shown to have similar results for PCE values of HDR images, regardless
of the fingerprint type. Considering the fact that the majority of devices did
not show a big difference between the fingerprints based on HDR and SDR
images, the conclusion derived for previously described SDR images analysis
can be confirmed.
Comparing devices that deviate from the conclusion for SDR and HDR
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images at this stage of analysis, it can be seen that the same devices appear
in both of the cases. This makes a total of 7 out of 23 devices which produce
a noticeably different fingerprint when different types of images are used in
the process of fingerprint computation.
Having conducted the analysis of both image types and fingerprint types
separately, it is worth paying attention to the overall results. The ones
obtained for devices A13 and A14 are of a special interest because they
show a distinctive difference between SDR and HDR images taken by those
devices. In those cases, SDR images have had high PCE values, no matter
if the correlation was performed using flat SDR- or HDR-based fingerprint,
while HDR images have had low PCE value, except from the images captured
while shaking the camera device. Therefore, fingerprint type did not show
to have a big influence on the results in this case, but the type of the images
did. Moreover, camera movements were confirmed to have an impact on the
results.
7.3.3 MIX category results analysis
The previous research stages considered separately HDR and SDR images,
not only as single objects used for the purposes of source identification test-
ing, but also in the process of fingerprint computation. This section deals
with combined sets of HDR and SDR images captured by the same device,
which are contained in the MIX category. At this stage, fingerprints were
computed based on the relevant MIX set of images for all the employed
devices. Results from the previously described analysis served as a motiva-
tion for this step, because it was shown that sources are identifiable even
in the cases when correlation was computed between the HDR image noise
and SDR image fingerprint and vice versa. Considering the fact that the
original image properties are rarely available in the real-case scenarios when
source identification is needed, MIX category of images can provide the most
reliable results for source identification.
The obtained results are shown in Fig. 7.14-7.17. It can be seen that the
averaged PCE value of images captured by most of the devices was above
the threshold when MIX category of images was used as a reference.
SDR images from devices A01-A06 have shown better performances than
their HDR counterparts when they were captured by steady hand or using
tripod. On the other side, images taken by shaky hand using devices A02,
A04 and A05 have had similar PCE values, regardless of the image type, in
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correlation to the MIX flat fingerprint. The other half of the devices from
this set have shown better results for SDR images in case of shaking motion.
In this case, captures taken by shaky hand lead to bigger variations in results,
comparing to more steadily captured images. This observation is justified
by the fact that camera movement shifts the fingerprint matrices, making
different offsets for the analyzed images. The offset depends on the velocity
of the camera, which has not been measured during the dataset formation
process.
Difference between SDRs and HDRs in terms of PCE value was not sig-
nificant for devices A07-A10 when the MIX-based fingerprint was employed.
SDRs have shown better performances for devices A11 and A12, with the
exception of images taken by shaky hand using A11 device. In that case,
PCEs were comparable for SDR and HDR images. Similar conclusions can
be conducted by analyzing results obtained for devices A13-A17, where only
captures taken by devices A15 and A17 in shaking motion have similar PCE
values for both SDRs and HDRs, while the rest of the devices and motion
scenarios show the advantage of SDR images in source identification process
using PRNU method.
Deviation from the previous results occurred in the analysis of iPhone
devices. Images captured by I01-I06 in different motions have shown com-
parable PCE values for both SDR and HDR images. All the values were
above the threshold, with the exception of one part of the images taken by
I04 device using tripod. These results lead us to the conclusion that iPhone
devices are easier to identify than other devices included in this research, no
matter of the type of the analyzed image. This conclusion corresponds to
the one conducted after analyzing impact of using different types of images
and the same SDR- or HDR-based fingerprint for PRNU computation.
7.3.4 Reliability of source identification
The final stage of analysis was determining reliability of PRNU-based source
identification. As it is stated in the previous sections, reliability of the pro-
cedure results was decided based on calculated PCE values. The threshold
PCE value was chosen to be equal to 45.
Results have shown that both SDR and HDR image sources can be de-
tected using this threshold, with the exception of HDR images taken from
devices A12, A14 and partially A6 and A17. Considering this fact, it is
clear that PRNU method cannot be generally applied, because the devices
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themselves can introduce variable hidden digital content to the images they
produce or affect the procedure in other manner.
The most reliable source identification was provided for devices A07, A09,
A10, I01, I02, I03, I05 and I06. Camera movements and usage of flat images
were shown to have a minimal effect to PCE value for the previously men-
tioned devices. On the other hand, devices A06, A12 and A16 were shown
to produce higher PCE values for SDR, than HDR images. Furthermore,
source identification from SDR images was less prone to camera movements
for those devices. Taking the previous statements into account, it can be
concluded that complexity of HDR images introduces difficulties in source
identification for some devices. This phenomenon requires further analysis
of the HDR images creation procedure for the devices of interest.
7.3.5 Analysis of low PCE values
During the image analysis using standard PRNU method, it was noticed
that PCE value is unexpectedly low for some of the captures, in comparison
to the PCE values of other analyzed images from the same set. Guided by
this fact, it was decided to post-process the results in order to determine the
reason of poor PCE values for single cases.
The result obtained from A01 model is provided in Fig. 7.18. Twenty
groups of images were captured in different motions and modes. Each group
was provided the same image content as controlled variable. Considering
the differences in acquisition process of SDR and HDR images, it can be
concluded, by comparing the PCE values among three different motions,
that image alignment has a serious impact on performances of the PRNU-
based method. As shown in Fig. 7.18, PCE values of SDR images are higher
than the ones of HDR images captured in hand motion. However, situation
is opposite in tripod motion. The reason could be that the image alignment
operation in hand motion changes positions of pixels, which leads to the
mismatch between the noise image extracted from HDR image and R-PRNU.
In the case of tripod motion, multiple images with perfect alignment are used
to extract noise image. It is well-known that the more images are employed,
the more precisely the PRNU is calculated. Therefore, higher PCE values
could be obtained for HDR images in this case. In case of shaking motion,
depending on the algorithms used in each device, on the one hand, the shift
among the images would be too big to align images, which improves the
PCE value of HDR images. On the other hand, image alignment is executed
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reducing the PCE value of HDR images.
In order to further explore the reason behind the change of PCE value be-
tween SDR and HDR images, PRNU method based on the pixel patches was
applied. Firstly, the images and R-PRNU were cropped into non-overlapping
pixel patches with 128×128 size. Then, the PCE values for each pixel patch
were calculated and for each image pair (SDR and HDR images), they were
mapped into the same scale with log function to obtain the PCE map. PCE
maps of SDR and HDR images captured in hand motion (Fig. 7.19) are
shown in Fig. 7.20.
An interesting phenomenon occurs at smooth image regions with low
luminocity, such as ground with low brightness. PCE values of HDR images
have had higher values than their SDR counterparts in that case. The same
results were obtained for both over- and under-exposed image regions. On
contrary, PCE values were decreased for the pixel patches with smooth and
high luminance, such as the blue sky. The reason could be that HDR images
keep balance between the dark and bright areas and the PRNU-based method
performs better for the images with much smoother and higher luminance.
According to the previously described analysis, it can be concluded that, for
the smooth pixel patches with higher luminance, but not saturation, HDR
and SDR images both have high PCE values. Moreover, image regions with
over/under-exposure usually lead to low PCE value. In addition, the images
captured with strong amount of noise, such as the night scene shown in the
last column of Fig. 7.20, also have low PCE value.
The above presented analysis is more specific, rather general, due to the
fact that each device has its own specifics which directly influence the results
of PCE values obtained on images acquired by them. Considering that,
the further analysis in terms of image acquisition [114] and sensor pattern
noise specifics [80] is required. Proposed dataset provides the ability for this
and wider researches, such as estimation of displacement fields from pairs
of digital images [115] and characterization of the dynamic behaviour of a
mechanical chain tensioner by functional tolerating [116].
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Figure 7.8: PCE values obtained by SDR and HDR images when compared
with a flat HDR - based fingerprint (devices A01-A06).
7.3 Results 89
Figure 7.9: PCE values obtained by SDR and HDR images when compared
with a flat HDR - based fingerprint (devices A07-A12).
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Figure 7.10: PCE values obtained by SDR and HDR images when compared
with a flat HDR - based fingerprint (devices A13-A17).
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Figure 7.11: PCE values obtained by SDR and HDR images when compared
with a flat HDR - based fingerprint (devices I01-I06).
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Figure 7.12: Example of result obtained correlating noise from HDR images
captured by I02 model with SDR images fingerprint.
Figure 7.13: Example of result obtained correlating noise from SDR images
captured by A07 model with HDR images fingerprint.
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Figure 7.14: PCE values obtained by SDR and HDR images when compared
with a flat MIX- based fingerprint (devices A01-A06).
94 PRNU-based source identification using HDR images
Figure 7.15: PCE values obtained by SDR and HDR images when compared
with a flat MIX- based fingerprint (devices A07-A12).
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Figure 7.16: PCE values obtained by SDR and HDR images when compared
with a flat MIX- based fingerprint (devices A13-A17).
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Figure 7.17: PCE values obtained by SDR and HDR images when compared
with a flat MIX- based fingerprint (devices I01-I06).
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Figure 7.18: Example of result obtained correlating noise from HDR images
captured by A01 model with SDR images fingerprint.
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(a) Examples of SDR images
(b) Examples of HDR images
Figure 7.19: Examples of (a) SDR and (b) HDR images.
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(a) PCE map for examples of SDR images
(b) PCE map for examples of HDR images
Figure 7.20: PCE maps for examples of SDR and HDR images.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
In order to obtain reliable results in multimedia forensics investigations, hav-
ing a properly formed dataset with all the information needed is of a crucial
importance. During the research activities conducted within this thesis,
three novel datasets of images and videos were introduced. Datasets were
further used in source identification procedure based on the well-known algo-
rithms, in order to investigate the impact of acquisition processes of modern
smartphone devices on the procedure. Different camera motions, multime-
dia types and compression algorithms used in several social media platforms
were taken into account.
As most of the available databases face the problem of non-expandability,
they suffer from becoming out-dated and inadequate for investigations in the
field of multimedia forensics. MOSES was introduced as a solution in the
form of mobile application able to record and store videos in the dataset
already containing a large number of video files. Being easily accessible and
simple for using, MOSES has a good potential for creating a large, con-
tinuously updated and expanded video dataset. As it is relatively novel
application, its popularity and success should be traced in order to make im-
provements and optionally include possibility for uploading images alongside
of videos. Moreover, for enabling further researches on the created dataset,
it will become publicly available on-line in the near future.
VISION was introduced as the second proposed dataset, containing both
images and videos. PRNU-based source identification was tested on this
dataset and PRNU estimates computed on the basis of videos and images
acquired by the same devices were compared. Comparison has shown that
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the estimates have significant differences and that some manipulations have
to be performed in order to match them. Considering the adequate algorithm
has not been developed up to this date, VISION can serve as a suitable
testing dataset in the researching process, due to the large span of multimedia
and information it contains.
Furthermore, previously mentioned datasets include images and videos
exchanged through the most popular social media platforms, thus enabling
investigation of the exchanging impact on the original files. The research
conducted in this thesis has shown that this procedure introduces difficulties
in source identification based on PRNU estimation, lowering the correlation
between the exchanged multimedia and its acquiring device. The thesis in-
troduced an analysis of ROC curves produced for original multimedia and
multimedia exchanged through WhatsApp, Facebook and YouTube, provid-
ing comparison of source identification reliability. However, deeper analysis
of the impact of different compression algorithms, factors and the number of
compression times on source identification procedure is required.
PRNU-based source identification algorithm was shown to have obstacles
in case of MOSES and VISION datasets, although they contained multime-
dia files which were mostly obtained using standard capturing profile. For
the purposes of investigating other possible obstacles introduced with mod-
ern smartphone devices, HDR images were analyzed as well, due to their
complexity and wider dynamic range. It was shown that HDR images, in
most cases, are harder to correlate with the source device, comparing to SDR
images. As their popularity increases, this can become a burning problem
and research topic not only for HDR images, but also for HDR videos.
Different camera motions and device characteristics were also shown to
affect the results. As the obtained results could not be generalized to all the
capturing devices, the need for deeper analysis in terms of acquisition pro-
cesses of the employed devices is imposed. Further researches on this topic
can also include photographic devices, which use different capturing pro-
cedures than smartphones. This investigation can help in obtaining more
generalized results in terms of reference pattern noise-based source identifi-
cation possibilities.
Considering the scope and content of datasets presented in this thesis,
they can be employed in various multimedia forensics investigations, but also
in other scientific fields related to image and video files.
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